Animating Analytics

By: Jonathan Seidel

Talmudic commentary and philosophical exercise: R Shkop and academic derivation—a talmudic synthesis 

R Shimon Shkop has been of noticeable academic interest. Articles dissecting his vision have been published over the years. Quoting his magnum opus to ascertain his ideals. Projecting a unique worldview that is not necessarily explicit in his terminology. Though it raises a few questions whether such derivation is recommended, whether if it is genuine and if both two are checked is the adequate means of publishing ideas?

It is noteworthy that R Shkop never wrote a philosophical work and even if he had written a book on machshava, it is not the book that is quoted. The work quoted is his talmudic commentary Shaarei Yosher. Shaarei Yosher unlike Maimonides' code does not add theological or ethical pieces. It is a strict talmudic work analysing the text and earlier commentaries. He follows in the footsteps of his predecessors. Though there is a significant difference which is his style. He is not the first to do so but he analysed the talmud not textually but conceptually. In the brisker motif, he paid close attention to the concepts instead rather than the text as others did. It is through this conceptualisation that the philosophical meaning can be imposed and derived. Whether or not he intended, his use of this method was less about understanding the textual format and more the idea surrounding it. By taking a step back and analysing the concept as a whole, as a mechanism, his work was exposed to the academic joy of research.

Apparently, it is possible to write a philosophical work without intending it to be a philosophical work. No jargon no systemic method, just a commentary. Yet his commentary has been studied. He is not the only talmudist to be analysed. The Griz and Ketzot have been placed under the philosophical microscope. Neither of these is academically available but the academic inserts his will to see if he can divulge patterns that would seemingly connect with certain philosophical ideas. This is in stark contrast to the Rav who wrote systematic books. His neo-Kantian education assisted him in cultivating such a response. His books were intentionally philosophical. His talmudic works are written differently and lack the philosophical quality. Even if there is a hint of his philosophy in his commentary, it can be brushed off as a philosopher incidentally adding his thought to the text. Once he learned philosophy he could never unlearn it. It is possible some of it creeped into the text. Yet for the former who never studied, such an exercise seems overplayed. 

It is unclear whether the academic is applying philosophy to the commentary or the commentary actually speaks philosophy. Other than a systemic philosophical work of the Spanish scholars from Saadia to Abarbanel. The works of Halevi, Maimonides and Hasdai ruled the day of philosophical enterprise. Yet they were dubbed philosophy while biblical commentaries and derashot were necessarily catalogued as such. Kitvei Ramban and Ran’s derashot are philosophical sermons. Maharal wrote commentaries on holidays as did Bnei Yissachar eluding their philosophical feelings. Biblical commentaries most of all illuminate this especially amongst Nahmanides and Gersonides. The sermons and commentaries are written differently but both began with a phrase or an idea and detail the idea from there. It remains within the layman canon. Many layman read without necessarily recognising the philosophical breath beneath. The difference between Kitvei Ramban and Perush Ramban is the lack of systemic articulation. The order of the latter follows the text. The text lends to tangents but is not categorised nor compiled for idea making just for providing. 

The commentary on the Torah is esoteric. It seems like an innocent commentary but it is more a tangential idea. While Rashi and the Ibn Ezra may be the exception to the rule, there is a lot of derash to the peshat attempt. The goal of commentary seems to be deduce sermonic ideas instead of systemic formulation. The Maharal has written on all most everything. The one real commentarial piece is his super-commentary on Rashi. His regular commentary on the Torah is called Derosh All haTorah. Be’er haGola on Agadot even his Chiddueshi Agadot, Derech Chaim. These commentarial pieces are philosophically laced pieces. Gevurot Hashem on the Hagada along with the Gur Aryeh are outliers. Yet Maharal is no outlier. He is part of the philosophical derivation unit. In the modern day, R Shagar is akin to Maharal with works on various holidays, the Rav, R Kook, R Sacks all wrote systemic philosophical works like Halevi, Maimonides, Hasdai . R Lichtenstein seems more in Ran’s camp. The Rav wrote a talmudic commentary while Rav Kook wrote halakhic pesak. Every Sage is unique but there are consistent models even if some right more today than others. 

The presence of philosophical discourse is present even if non-systemic works till this day. It can be argued that there is more evident philosophy today through the works of various orthodox leaders (my unfamiliarity with haredi thinkers may undermine this point). The philosophy of R Hunter’s holiday derashot or Chazon Ish’s anatomical divinity is based in their lecturing. This is not the same for talmud learning. It never has with the exception of Levinas who is a philosopher reading the Talmud. Beyond such a fringe yet fruitful character, talmudic commentary was for halakha and thus except for the aggadic sections, there wasn’t much to even talk about. Modern mystics promoting aggadah were doing so in contrast to halakha. To liberate the imprisoned aggdah to flourish in its colourful array over the strict legalism. The Rav’s claim that philosophy ought to be derived from halakha is not only a polemic but a blunder. This is quite different than the haredi model that denies philosophy. The machshava there is of the past greats in mussar and mysticism. They may not learn the Guide or Halakhic Man but some have read Tanya, they’ve been privy to Nahmanides, Ran, Maharal and others. The sermonic teachings are educated. 

None of these are in the realm of halakhic philosophy. At least not from its mechanics. Lonely Man of Faith may be argued to be a non-halakhic philosophy and more a biblical extrapolation. The Rav’s comments were not against Maimonides but against the aggadists of his day. The obsession with the narrative portion and other non-halakhic aspects. His Halakhic Man is a subscription to the way of halakha. The halakha is the centre with other parts as a nice extra. Yet Tosafot commented on the Talmud and wrote responsa but never issued a philosophy from halakha. They either were mystics or ethicists. Yet both do little to bolster this point. No talmudist did this. Maharal kind of did it but through allegorical sources more often than not yet he was part of this up in coming crew. There is a huge difference between the Maharal’s talmudic commentary and his predecessors. The launch of conceptual learning changed the paradigm. No longer was the goal terminology. Even biblical commentaries transformed into conceptual illustrations then textual derivations. Netziv and R Hirsch demonstrate different types of commentarial style. One focused on ideas and one focused on words. The shift from the French Rishonim to the Achronim is the textual to conceptual.   

What defines the 18th to 19th century is the type of talmud learning. Whether it was inspired by the enlightenment or the haskalah doesn’t matter. What does matter is that its style captured a new shift. Pnei Yehoshua revived the textual formula from his predecessor Maharshal and passed it on to Gra, Shagaas Aryeh and Volozhin. Yet the pilpul narcotic failed to die and revived incrementally in the works of Ketzots and Netivot HaMishpat. The analytical strain followed to the Beis Halevi and his successors. It thus not shocking to find a dissertation on R Yom Tov Heller, a peer reviewed article on R Simcha Meir of Dvinsk  and a book chapter on R Yosef Rosen. Despite the latter two writing more machshavadic works on the Torah their halakhic derivations were analysed. It isn’t whether one was consciously being philosophical but rather if their style fits a philosophical presence. Going through R Meir Simcha and R Rosen’s commentaries on the Rambam are explaining his thought. Nothing to grow overloaded with potential Kantian jargon slipping in. No call of metaphysics parlayed with theology. Rather it is the analytical model that flaunts the possibility. This the academic insolence of talmudic scholars. Drawing philosophy from unintended philosophy. Maybe Netziv and Chazon Ish had a point about conceptualism. Maybe it ought to be ignored in the face of traditional textualisaiton.  

R Shkop is different since his only book of thought is his talmudic commentary. There is no where else to look. Unlike Maimonides’ Mishnah Torah, his commentary is not openly arguing for any philosophy. Like the Ketzot, there is much underneath that may be promoted but never said aloud. Both Mescheh Chochma and Tzafnat Panaech have their machshava employed through modern biblical commentary. The hybrid between the systemic prose of the Spanish thinkers and the French grammarians. It is thus interesting whether R Shkop is philosophising behind a talmudic commentary. He may be doing so subconsciously or inadvertently through his analytical means. The issue with analytics is that it comes close to such philosophising without actually dealing with the jargon of cosmic questions. Yet his approach to legal theology may be apparent as was exposed by the Rav’s analytical heritage. Yet if R’ Shkop subscribed to the model is unknown since he never made his opinion public. Nevertheless, there is a taint of philosophy because of the analytical style. Yet analytical doesn’t mean philosophy, it is just a different style. Reading too deeply is misunderstanding their approach for academic fun. 

Still, given the level of conceptualisation how the scholar defines law, ownership and prohibition fit into philosophical subjects. He need not be a Kantian nor read Hume to be a philosopher. By analysing the concepts by themselves independently of the text. The text is important only to bolster the concept. The halakha is a living tree and its branches are blossoming. Applying logic and analysis to the talmudic canon, the philosophy springs out of the sealed bottle. In a way R Shkop was a philosopher but a talmudist philosopher. So were his analytical brethren. Since they animated the norms into a logical quota they began experimenting and hypothesising. Yet whether it’s R Shkop, R Chaim, the Rav or R Lichtenstein, the goal of the analytical use is not to philosophise but explain the suyga. Even if philosophy is evident it is not the purpose. Unlike Maimonides and like Nahmanides, R Meir Simcha, the Rav and R Lichtenstein kept their philosophising and their conceptualising separate. They both may use logic but one is for the sake of extending beyond the sugya and one is to remain in the sugya. One is to explain halakhic concepts and one is to explain philosophical concepts. They are part of two different worlds. They may intersect at times but they need not imply one’s philosophical feelings. 

This is not the move of Levinas or even R Shagar. The sugya is not the foundation to teach new ideas. This is not the way of the Maharal or R Kook. This talmudic approach ignores the halakhic conceptualisation as a philosophy in of itself. It need not engage in other affairs. This is itself a question to the Rav who made this remark in a 40s book that was only published after he had written numerous others. Even Uvikashtem Misham is not a halakhic construct nor is his biblical expositions published in Tradition. Did the Rav intend on arguing that one ought to just quote from halakhic sources? If he left it unchanged was this something he came back to? The method was outlined in Lonely Man of Faith (Smilowitz). If this is correct then the Rav’s potential thought maybe twofold: either right a systemic work highlighting the halakhic opinions to illuminate the idea or alternatively one can write a commentary that examines concepts alongside the text. It is doesn’t seem to matter the style only that the philosophical concept in this case the existential inquiries are extrapolated through halakhic means. The genius is not merely quoting texts to buttress a claim but rather cleverly apply them to the concept. Seem to be a philosopher but really a closet talmudist. The footnotes if anyone actually analyses the end of the book will be shocked at such marvellous beauty. 

This model differs from R Sacks, R Shagar and even maybe R Lichtenstein’s works. Yet the latter along with R Rabinovitch were not really philosophers but rather examining their ideas in light of the text. Still, there is much to work with. Much to impress. R Rabinovitch’s “Way of Torah” is an impassioned use of halakhic sources to prove a point. Tackling Emanut Chachamim was more Talmudic than philosophical but yet a riveting insightful essay. Neither was short on philosophical knowledge just read their essays in the original Modern Jewish Ethics but it is different than the Rav’s style. Nothing to take away from them nor even R Kook. Yet the Rav’s use of sources was to be tangential like the Spanish thinkers. To go on a rant with the halakha to wherever it takes you not to encircle back to the concept that began. The topic was a “secular” concept to be “halakhified”. How does the halakha deal with the issue. Not many others have sought such a response. Both R Sacks and R Shagar asked these questions but often times either quoted secular thinkers or mystics. The halakha was not the backbone nor was the conceptualisation to augment the point. It was strictly a philosophical scene. Yet for the Rav it was both. He mended both worlds without encroaching on his talmudism. He brought his talmudism to philosophy not the other way around. His conceptualised style was apparent in early works and became the bedrock of his further thought. 

Even biblical theology whether through R Sacks or Wyschologrod is a matter of an anti-Soloveitchikean view. To which there exists no one else. This was the Rav’s special attraction of brisk to existentialism. From the halakhic idealism to the philosophical output. Had Maimonides quoted the Talmud over Aristotle. Ran and R Arama had the right idea of reviewing rabbinic literature to complete their thoughts but this along the same lines as R Lichtenstein is more machshava than philosophy. It doesn't reach the bounds of philosophical jargon. Of quoting Aristotle alongside the Talmud. Levinas did the opposite by applying his phenomenology to the talmud instead of applying his talmudism to phenomenology. Others have written machshava quoting Jewish figures. Teaching a sugya. The Rav instead lectured his own thoughts in his own jargon. It was an adventure beholden by the talmudic text footnoted. If R Sacks added more talmudic citations but that wasn’t his style. His philosophy was combining Chumash and philosophy while the Rav combined Gemara and philosophy, Both iconic but different styles of thinking. Some analytical thinkers attempt to bridge the gap but they aren’t talmudists just Levinas pupils.

There are seemingly two brisker styles. There is the Soloveitchik style and the Shkop style. The former is a philosophical jargonist writing elegantly and abstractly while footnoting rabbinic literature. Tackling the big questions of the day through the halakhic prism. The latter view is to write a talmudic commentary riddled with themes and motifs. One’s philosophical analysis whether analytical or phenomenological turns the suyga into a philosophical project. Halakhic analysis embedded whether obvious or not so obvious. Whether a talmudist accidentally or intentionally philosophising or a philosopher shteiging. Both provide a halakhic narration of conceptualised ideals. The goal isn’t to lecture a set of notes set before by others but improve one’s own ideas. Add nuance and tangential comments that illustrate compound thinking. A chuddish furthering the abstractions. Both shteiging and philosophising are theoretical practices. Study and write. Concretise them when necessary but deeply ponder their significance and emphasis their prowess. Whichever side is chosen the talmudism is profound. The lecture is not mere understanding by innovating. Creativity and maximisation. Hoping to engage more and extrapolate more. Learning is growth with one’s additions and insertions.

The Rav’s model has yet to be reclaimed. Many have taken up the Maharal’s model. A quasi-Shkopian version were philosophy derived from rabbinic literature. R Nagen analyses the Mishnayot with philosophical underpinnings. Rabbinic literature is the start to philosophising. It is a commentary piece that allows the tangent to flourish. Maharal remained true to the text before heading on his adventure. His jargon slowly became philosophical but the foundation of talmudic thought began each thought. R Nagen follows a similar theme adding in the philosophical output. R Reem is closer to the Shkopian model. R Reem analyses the sugya through the different commentaries. Ye he adds nuance based on his reading. Through conceptualism he finds new patterns and new philosophical underpinnings. While R Nagen doesn’t play with the brisker model in the same regard Reem does insert his ideas into the talmudic illustration. The sugya is open for all sorts of new ideas. The tangent is a new conceptual innovation. Both provide an alternative route. A way of philosophising from the text. Whether from the text to philosophy or from philosophy in the text.        

Was R Shkop a closet philosopher? The world may never know but that shouldn’t stop his successors from trying the historically possible and making it historically certain. To be a philosophical talmudist is to bridge both worlds and write systemically or interpretively.