Conceptual Respect

 

By: Jonathan Seidel

Brisk+halakhic man through a "Lacanian" lens 

Brisker conceptualism cultivated contradictions through logic rather than linguistics. These contradictions moulded the meta-level of the debate. One of these is the difference between heftza and gavra—subject and object. This conceptual ideal finds similarities in post-hegelian philosophy. 

Briskers differed from their predecessors. Instead of focusing on textually they instead sought logic as the method of choice. While generally reserved for theoretical deductions which is why the tractates of Menachot and Zevachim were studied to keep the insights out of the practical guide. The conceptual approach did cross over a few halakhic decision-making occasions. In one such example R Chaim argued that for tashlumin (make up-davening 2x) for maariv motzei Shabbat one says ata chonantanu in the first shacharit and not the second as would presumed since the second amida is the make up one. Since the logic of ata chonantanu is to be recited in the first prayer after Shabbat and not specifically to marriv just that marriv happens to be that prayer. If it was forgotten the next prayer shacharit would be recited there. In another case, also against the grain Beit Halevi (R Chaim’s father) argued that even if one forgot a blessing on the omer they can still continue to make a blessing since there are two mizvot—one on weeks and one on days. 

The examples are to demonstrate in practical analysis how logic plays a role in subsuming complications. In other theoretical cases the difference is syntactical between two blessings those using “shel” and others “li”. The “shel” group corresponds to deeds on the heftza namely that a menorah needs to be lit not necessarily that someone ought to light it. On the other hand the “li” group namely to put on teffilin are on the subject to perform. While to some extent the object-centred stills needs someone to fulfil it but in the case reading the Torah, it is not an individual command but on the community. The Torah needs be read but it isn’t an individual obligation. Emphasis is everything. The conceptual approach seeks to validate through logic. For the most part it is trying to solve priorly encoded texts such as Maimonides or the off-beaten tractates in Kodshim that people rarely touch due to their complexity and irrelevance to daily life. Then again Rav Lichtenstein reapplied the model to other tractates with some variance and evidently the Rav did in his philosophy.

Yet it is only the Rav who incorporated the brisker model with neo-kantian themes into his philosophy. While there are similarities with his students, Rav Lichtenstein and Rav Twersky both proposed their own theologies respectively. The Rav instead pioneered his philosophical formulation of the brisker model. While halakhic man focuses on the conceptualisation of a priori ideals it doesn’t develop the brisker duality. The idealist Hegelian synthesis of halakhic man finalises the scientific realism. Halakhic man has little to do with reconciliation. It has all to do with deducing the correct law just as one finds the correct mathematical solution. Unlike, Lonely Man of Faith which focuses on the typology of reconciling biblical dialectics. Diverting from the usual talmudic or Maimonidean reconciliation for a biblical one. In this case, the use of logic is applied to differentiate between two texts. Each chapter of Genesis and mention of Adam denotes a different conceptual frame. One Adam is pragmatic and the other Adam is existential. One seeks to cultivate while the other seeks to communicate. 

Lonely Man of Faith and the Rav’s other essays fit the brisker modelling. The Rav’s use of brisker ideals into his exegetical enterprise was a tribute to his heritage. Rav Lichtenstein may have extended the model to other tractates but the Rav truly applied the conceptual distinction between the dualistic hermeneutic in his essays. The Rav formally cradled his brisker dialectical ideals in the biblical format. Teaching wisdom through exegesis. That exegesis is built into the metaphysic. The brisker realism produces the concepts, the ideals as genuine formats. While this has more of an impact in law concerning inanimate objects that become realised through the formulation of the law. A chair is not a chair but a halakhic chair the same is of the sunset. The world becomes a halakhic consecution. Just as the mystics reevaluate the world through a new lens so too the briskets turn the world into their own spiritual basin. Their spiritual basin is not made of energy or meditation but legal quandaries. The law is the baseline for the idealised manifestation. The a priori formulation enables the metaphysic layout to adapt to the legal decisions of the poskim.

This metaphysic in hand leads to a rather different philosophical model. Halakhic Man dealt with neo-kantianism and his essays were dual archetypes. Two different dinim at place. The brisker rollout is also materialised by its own classification. The Rav while demonstrating a typology doesn’t necessarily accord his Adams nor his covenants as part of the brisker system. They are culmination of the dialectical style not connected to R Chaim’s adherents. The typology has some roots in the brisker  identity but is far more of its own philosophical derivation than from brisk itself. As these typologies are not of the typical categories. The Rav may have created a new one or fit them into the categories but they are extensions and not the categories themselves. The subject-object or active-passive can be evaluated on its own. It is the former that even more pressing in its philosophical mania. While it may not have much to do with dialectical characteristics in the biblical format from which the Rav was learning, they are necessary to the analytical metaphysic that R Chaim produced through his students. The format acknowledges the various classifications inherent to the halakhic frame. They are just tools in an talmudists' inventory but undergird the halakhic enterprise. 

The subject-object example is far more philosophical in nature. Hegel distinguished between the subject observer and the object observed. For Hegel the subject-object are synthesised as are in Brisk. Briskers synthesised subject-object in the halakha. Halakhic man is the Hegelian synthesis of the brisker distinctions. These contradictions are reconciled in their own duality but are comforted in the halakhic stratosphere. The idealist notions are able to bring these separate classifications into one circle. The halakha is the larger classification combing these two distinction. It is similar to a family tree were offspring are linked to the patriarch. Esau and Jacob may be too different people but they are both sons of Isaac. So too with subject and object halakhic modes in the halakha. Kant actively synthesises the content which may be the creative aspect of halakhic man as he is passively affected by the system. Though for Hegel the creative subject is passivised. He engages a system that engulfs him. The system exists without his cognition he is merely mathematically deducing the adequate response. Nahmanides argued that God gave Moses forty nine yes and forty nine no. Every sequence mapped for the court to decide the course of action. Everything imparted in advance.

The creative subject engages a system with a framework prepared. It is his indulgence to apply the new variables to the a priori notions. The forty nine yes-no are typical cases, typical precepts that when given inferred the socio-technological shifts but could not predict the inventions. Therefore the new variables are uploaded to the massive halakhic computer to analyse the findings against the system’s coded frame. Electricity did not exist when the Torah nor the Talmud was written. Whether the result is mavir, mitaken mana or boneh, electricity is seen as a non-shabbosdik aspect that is at odds with traditional precepts. The results are analogised from the talmudic frame. Yet it is simply not in the spirit of Shabbos. Logically, it is problematic utility that opposes the conceptual identity of Shabbos. For the subject to be ordained by the object matter is to be engulfed in its metaphysical reality. The subject doesn’t control the object but is an independent device with its own vitality. The object supersedes the subject through its immortality. The subject can but revere the object and offer it alterations when necessary.

The subject-object relationship as coined by the Rav indicates the inverse of the common sense deduction of the subject-object connection. Most assume that the subject controls the object. Yet adversary, here the object controls the subject. The halakha like the constitution is the authority beholding the subjects to its whims. The subject’s freedom is by and large mythologized. The object has spread its influence to consume the subject. The subject has but to accept its proposal or reject it all. The object looms large in the existential drought of meaningless array. The subject is but a lack. He is but imperfect. The subject is endorsed into the complementary order. The subject finds others to ensure none stumble. The subjects are all incomplete searching to fill that void. Their lack is healed by another. The Rav’s Adam II is the existential lack seeking redemption in like-minded believers. From loneliness alone to loneliness together. For the Rav there are two types of loneliness. There is emotional and existential loneliness or in Soloveitchian terms there is natural and revelational loneliness. The latter is imprinted in the mental disdain Moses feels throughout his journey. He is the constant outsider lacking any national collectivism. He is their guide, hired to do a job for then him to get to his next gig. The believer is dealing with his own private faith but speaking with others warms the struggle solidifying the isolated lack. 

The object can never be reached. It remains beyond the halakhist. The object is the divine law and thus so is man’s use is to configure it not remake it. Its self sufficiency only need to be chosen. The halakha was given to man for his sake. The subject was immature and immaterial seeking salvation. A paradox exists. The subject can overtake the object. It can refute its prowess for the new reformed models. The halakhic metaphysic grounds the truth of the world. Trying to alter the law is to outrun its mechanics and function. The halakha is grounded in its ontological formulation. Trying to reform its modelling is to desperately attempt to capture it but by doing so the halakha has been corrupted and the halakhist no longer of the brand. The subject must engage the object as it stands. Not try to conform its identity to his whims as doing so will erode or eradicate the object. The object will persist with the new object of the subject’s marvel becoming a foolish cousin of the old object. The creation of the desperation to conform is a halakhic system and not the halakhic system. A metaphysic of anthropocentric creation that dies with the community while the halakhic system remains firm in its metaphysical layer even if rejected by all. 

Subjects are but trying to impose their will on the object. The object is of the subject’s concern. It is the subject’s job to manipulate and designate the object. It is this world of symbolism that the subject attaches personal meaning and intention upon the object. Here the halakhist attempts to psychologise and historicise the halakha. He tries to make the object of his imagination. The effort exerted on the object does not enrich the object but distorts it. The object is no longer of its own will. It no longer maintains the heteronomous otherness nor its kinship to the deity who gifted it. It is man’s toy to reform. This is the inherent lack baked into the representative failure. It is the active exertion that inherently devolves the beauty and sanctity of the halakha. Even when certain mechanical shifts are proscribed the human unknown represents an uncertainty. The lack is the signified uncertainty of the divine will. Faith in God and the faith in the halakha is the halakhist’s creative integrity. The halakhist is careful and considers his creative ability in the face of the object’s modesty. The halakhist doesn’t believe the halakha is a tool in his inventory but a guide to his life. He respects the object of divine manifestation to bring him ever closer to his God.

The goal isn’t to transform the halakha into personified being. The halakha is not a physical being but the halakha is a lifestyle. A metaphysical worldview that just as spirituality for mystics alters the perception of the mind. The halakhic order is the law whether in its pharisaic oral form or in its maimonidean coded form. The law is the flow of Jewish action. The object is intangible. The halakha is the object of fascination in Judaism. Bic Mac is associated with the American experience following with an imagined obese population. Halakha is the spirit of Judaism. The signifier of its religion. The Big Mac can be eaten and the halakha can be executed but the idea of both remains beyond. The halakha can seem overestimating or tedious and yet the halakha is executed. Whatever the perception of the subject, the object is still needed to complete the spirit of Judaism. The object remains a step beyond the subject’s reach. It is its divine gift, its elevated persona that retains its pure signification. The real remains apparent so long as the halakha remains the firsthand view of the believer. The spirit of Judaism is awed and feared. It is the documented style that fulfils its experiential meaning to the observant. It remains beyond the scope of the capable hands of the halakhist. He can cultivate through the postulates but the halakha is an other than cannot be pierced by human emotion or social compulsion. 

The paradox of halakha is that on the one hand it stands in all its glory but the more it is debated it becomes vulgar. It becomes a tool to innovate and produce. Halakhic man marvels at the halakha from a theoretical standpoint. Standing far enough to revel in its beauty. Playing with its theoretical reconciliation through the literature. The ideal manifestation is the embodiment of the subject consumed by the object’s influence. The observant individual no longer appreciates his own subjectivity. While there is a strict unemotional side in favour of executing the halakha, these narratives do not necessarily represent the strictures of halakha. They represent the strictures of halakha to a certain mindset. The narratives may also proscribe alternative actions. The halakha dare not suggest perturb behaviour. It doesn’t erase the subject’s gaze. In pure contrast, the talmudic aggada does incorporate emotional failings. In this sense the halakhic men idealised are robotic in their gratitude for the heart-wrenching execution of the halakha. Yet had the narrative been an aspiration it would make sense. Of course the will of halakha is absolute. The sublime mania overwhelms any emotional indication. Yet the closer, the more directly engaged with the object the less static it becomes. For the poskim, this even more the case, how his own predilections are subconsciously imposed on deciding the law in its honest interpretation. 

Rigidity in the execution differs from irresolvable halakhic issues. Some bold halakhists may decide changes whether they are acceptable is based on other rabbinic opinions not from the halakha itself. The halakha never responds or critiques the shift. The halakha is passive and silent. Yet the strict recognise its beauty as they fail to realise that their own stringencies are extensions as well. The strict conservative halakhist grows close to the halakha and unwilling to manipulate the divine will in his finitude he recoils. He covers his eyes and flees. It is inevitable that the halakha will be ‘fractured’. The lack is the imperfection of reality. The mobility of crisis and the absence of semicha. The halakha in of itself is modelled in exile. It is a system designated for the desert. A time without a land and/or temple. The real halakha is the ideal that which cannot be transferred to reality. The angels protested with God to give them the Torah lest it be corrupted by humanity. It is not only the possibility of deliberate corruption but the evident imperfection of reality. With its rabbinic format, the Torah is not in heaven further supplements the lacking idealism. Halakha has become a pragmatic tool. Its sublime is recognised in study but in action it is modified for use. The halakhic men attempt to recapture the celestial ideal corrupted by human imperfection.

To some extent, this is a losing battle. The halakhic men are those of extraordinary character but at the same time have attempted to act against the typical observant Jew. While this may be praised for its efforts and is dually so, it is more a by product of object overwhelming than subject independence. They have permitted the halakha to overcome them. This sounds amazing. This sounds like the ultimate goal of the Jew. Yet it may be debated if this is the ultimate achievement. Whether as much as this may be an aspiration it is not the feasible goal. These halakhic men have omitted aggada. The aggada of the talmud is not some extra-legal tool but a narrational prose to the rabbinic humanity. It isn’t a code but a subject-object relationship. A legal statement is made followed by a narrative whether short or long concerning the legitimacy of that statement. The humanity projected is the counterproposal to black letter law. The law is imprinted or lectured but the narrative provides the embodied frame. Who is practicing this law and how are they doing it. The illustration musters a reaction to the talmudic statement. How halakha is lived is just as important, Since the illustration mocks the statement. How can the statement be authenticated when the verified story undermines its integrity. The halakha as a lived experience furthers the subjective matrix as an executer of halakha not just a pronouncer of it. 

The object of the talmud is the halakhic corpus. The narrational expedition is the subject illustrating the authenticated law. The visual clue is the verified source. In the same way the halakhic men are the ‘aggada’ to the scientific articulation of halakha. The stories verify or criticise the point of view. Halakhic men continuously ratify the belief yet they are but a few halakhic men. Only a handful of said figures are chosen: R Chaim R Feinstein and R Moshe HaLevi. While they may have been the author’s relatives there are countless stories in the talmud and other stories about recent greats. If Netziv, Vilna Gaon or R Chaim Volozhiner were handpicked, the stories may sound ever differently. Is this to say that the latter were not halakhic men? Were they not consumed by the object? Seemingly not. Their subjectivity is evident in their works. Their litvish stories deem emotion a piece of the halakhic puzzle. Alternatively the men of Brisk did not permit the halakha to consume them but instead acted in such rigid expression as a part of their identity. The halakha from afar retains its idealised notions. Yet the subject varies from individual. Certain halakhic men in the spirit of R Eliezer approached the object with hesitancy and even upon its vulgar recognition remained strict taping their mouths lest they corrupt the pure Torah. It was not the halakha that forced them but their own style while others in the spirit of R Yehoshua brought a more innovative style to the vulgar. None besmirched its sanctity only differing on personal methodology to the object. 

In this vein, subjects accept the inevitability of the vulgar sensation. There is no getting around the issue. The halakha will lose its idolised angelic nature as the Jew practices and as the Sage interprets. Yet some halakhic men attempt to maintain as much of the real as possible. The author seems to suggest this is the goal but the fact that others did not act as such may simply demonstrate either its rarity or needless attempt. Yet the definition of idolisation is still relevant. The subject may grow closer to the object and with each step assume the object is vulgar. The more control the subject has of the object the more the subject can and will manipulate it. Even the innovators still retain a distance. The halakha is an idealised system. There is only so much the subject can control. Instead of attempting to either control the halakha through one’s own constructed system or through altering the axioms. There is a limit since a subject who transforms the object into his plaything has contorted the system. The object is no longer the real object—it is not longer the halakha but a halakha. The a priori postulates ensure that the system is predated. Change exists but it is through the chemical medium not through some unscientific collaboration. The posek himself must reckon with the halakhic real. A force that is distant yet transferable on a limited symbolic level. 

Halakha is passive. It is an object of design. A gift from God for man to follow. For has Kohelet says that is the purpose of man. The halakha is indifferent yet symbolises the connection between man and God and man and man. Without the halakha there is but a faith and history that unites Jews. Yet the history itself is a heritage built on generations of halakhic observance. The biblical history is built into the halakhic system. The Christian faith is of sensational expression. It requires verbalism at times but rarely any action. The halakha demands action. While standing there a drill sergeant barking orders, it is at same time a mute system radiating light. It is self-sufficient to survive as a gift from God but it is man who engages and evolves the halakha. The halakha is happily concerned but the object lay in retrospect to man. It will forever elude him. He may follow its guidance, he may even make emendations but these were already endowed at Sinai. There is no novelty just repetition. It applying the principles to the new invention. The subject approaches analogises and adds the invention to the halakhic system. Prior to the Model T, the car did not have halakhic status. It didn’t exist. Yet once the question was raised and decided it was akin to riding a horse, it was forbidden. The subject emended the object as new information came to the forefront. It didn’t undermine but applied the a priori postulates to accurately update the halakhic system encoded in the realistic metaphysic. 

Halakha does differ from the Lacanian object. The object is elevated subjectively. It has no intrinsic value. The halakha does. Though halakha may have no intrinsic value but Torah does. The halakha is the handmaiden of Torah and thus is subject to change. The second difference accords to desire. Lacan’s object is a Freudian conception of sexual motifs. This is not the case of the halakha (or at least is not explicit nor nearly implied even if the sexual and the cleaving can be familiarised—as the Torah uses words like cleave over sexual action). Nonetheless outside the Freudian theme is still the dominating persona. The desire for control is still apparent whether there is sexual motifs or not. The accepted halakha as a concept as must accords with the subject’s ethical beliefs. If rejected the subject’s desire has its boundaries to which the halakha doesn't reach. The subject is no longer interested. Those who seek to manipulate the halakha to their whims are even worse since rejecters accept the sublimity of the object solely unwilling to accept its standards while manipulators dethrone its sublimity in order for it to cater to their ideals. The Lacanian object does exist in pedestaling objects into the sublime but the halakha is an object of gifted sublimity. Its sublimity, its sanctity precedes man’s encroachment. The object is just a mirror of man’s consideration of prestige while the halakha is an object independent of the subject even though at the same dependent.

Yet the Lacanian object is not the Hegelian object. The Hegelian object in his professed faith acknowledges the excellence of the object. It is not the mere illusion of the subject. For this is the author’s point. It is not a construction of the human telos and it is not the production of Catholic Israel. It remains beyond man’s horizons to engage in. It is the incarnate form of divinity. A text to endorse the divine instead of a being to do so. In a sense Christian Jesus is but a replacement for the Torah. Jesus’ teachings are upheld over the Torah and even more over halakha. Christianity usurped the word, the oral rendition for a cosmic preacher. The halakha is quote on quote God’s messenger on earth, a covenant to witness the divine’s relation with Israel. Yet the halakha is an inanimate object not a being. Thus Jesus fits the Lacanian model as being of desire. A pedestaled being that is provided sublimity but a title to elevate his prestige. To provide the object a personified entity with a virgin birth and a deified father. A fantasy of faithful history. On the other hand, the halakha acts as the incarnate lifestyle of the Jew. It is an object that remains pedestaled. It remains beyond since the illusion is real. It is faith in credibility. It is faith in a lifestyle. Jesus sought to expose the lack in the Judaic legalism, yet the lack was elusive in overstating an oral measure of norms.

The Hegelian motif further acknowledges the object as it is. Unlike realistic objects, the halakha is a matrix of focalised energy. The Lacanian objectification is more present in the need for the object of criteria to impassion the mind. For the rational faculty to be obsessed with the beauty of a women undressing. The object of concern is an illusion promising salvation but leaving empty. Such sublimity is the realistic object raised in the purview of the subject. It is the appearance in the subject’s horizon that he becomes agitated and desires to execute. His actions are predicated on a tranquil fantasy in the mind. This is unlike the halakha. The halakha does not proscribe the fascinations as its spiritual pursuit remains outside the bounds of the subject’s purview. The halakha is a mindset not a set of actions to complete. The object is idealised and without a visual can never be pedestaled to be vulgarised in such a toxic manner. Jesus can be though. As a human embodiment his statue in the garden becomes a symbol of fascinated hope. His pictures are relished in deep admiration. An uncanny lust for a dead man. Yet God’s graven image is nowhere nor is the halakha. The object remains but a caller on the other end. The halakha is sublime while the stripper or Jesus is beautiful. It is a measure of respect and pleasure.

The sublime God and halakha is therefore an object to behold. It is not something to control nor to overtake. It is to marvel in its grandeur. The beautiful is pleasuring. Pleasure is overtaken not by respect but lust and the illusion of hope forces the impassioned to seek to manipulate. This by no means discards the enjoyment of executing the halakha. The sublimity is enjoyable by following the commands. It is enjoyable by standing from afar. Engulfed in the experience not seeking to change the moment. The wonder is ever mysterious. The halakha is not an idea to be conquered or an entity to replace but a transcendent ideal. The ideal becomes an experience that occupies space and time. It a lifestyle across annual projection. Without the halakha the subject is unable to realise the object. The subject must internalise the object’s meaning to see the world as the halakha deems. It is no longer an object with archaic mechanics but spiritually doused concepts with experiential fervour. One’s love for the divine. The beauty of Torah is stopped short by the halakha. Cathartically retreating. Respecting the halakha that the love between bride and groom is stopped at its peak in order to preserve the credibility of the halakha. The subject renounces his own physical desire for spiritual desire. The wonder persists but shifts the paradigm. 

Halakhic men while versing different subjective approaches honour the halakhic system. The subject remains separated from the halakha. He lives under its rules and at times emends aspects under the guidance system. The methodology is metaphysically relational. The halakha is a worldview incorporated into the subject’s mind. The subject endorses the object as a part of his routine. Yet the halakha and Halakha are distinct. The Halakha can never be changed even though halakhot can. The subject encounters the object and obeys. The reciprocation is not moot. The halakha entails a new view. A child who has yet to learn the rules sees the world differently. He doesn’t maintain the mechanical art nor perceive the blessings as integral to realisation of the law. The spirit is nurtured into the mindset. Mysticism in a colloquial sense is embedded in the halakhic formulation. Halakhic men advance to accept the halakha and then recoil before overcoming the halakha. Before attempting to relinquish the authority of the object. The subject wields a will that the object fails. The object is pristine and canonical. The subject can but overtake the halakha but in respect of its sublimity just as the believer refuses to curse God. Choice and will are apparent but limits are self-imposed for the sake of the system. To be halakhic men is similar to be democratic. Yet unlike modern democratic structures over meaning, the halakha acts as it says. Providing the divine asset the believer cleaves. 

Through the Brisker art in a quasi-Hegelian-Lacanian lens, the Rav’s halakhic man becomes less neo-Kantian less archaic and profoundly more philosophical and experiential. The goal is to not to hyper-focus on the Rav’s subject art of Brisk identity but instead to recognise the veracity of halakhic hegemony. The Rav’s consistent respect for the halakha may be idealised in overtly conservative examples but at the same time R Eliezer did have R Yehoshua. The Rav did have counterparts who reflected his respect for halakha with some more innovative tales. It is less about the obsession with his strict aggadot and more the sublimity and honour for halakha. Halakhic man is a grand work and its message halakhic importance ought to be fulfilled is to be preserved.