Categorical Study

By: Jonathan Seidel

Conceptual Profundity:

The Brisker model reduces the dialectical discussion to two conceptual opposites. The details surrounding a sugya may vary but the foundation is similar. Removing the armoured layer detailing the baseline is a simple distinction between emphasis. Where does the intent lie? Is the obligation on the individual or on the object? Does the person or the object need to be elevated? While the argument on the surface may be why this matters, it is relevant for understanding halakhic disputes. Why does a certain sage conclude x while the other concludes y. A thorough analysis may expose the simple distinction or may focus so deeply on the details that with a simple step back the difference is staring straight in the face. It is also a measure of classification. Where does this deed fit on the scale. Are they more person or object motivated. The Brisker method may not be of conclusive utility to the posek but it does provide “common sense” information to the precise taxonomy.      

The ‘what’ question of the Briskers is derided by those who wish to know the rationale. For those who wish to understand the underlying purpose of the rule. To some extent the critique is valid if the ‘why’ is never achieved. If the ‘what’ is hyper-focused with little concern for the ‘why’. Hyper-focus on the ‘what’ turns Torah study into a theoretical exercise. It is to know for the sake of knowing. There is no reason beyond. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge. Such comprehension invalidates the basis of Jewish action. It question the purpose of study. R Akiva’s famous that study is greater since it leads to action (Kiddushin 40b) is only when that study leads to action. This model was the paradigm of Byzantine-Spanish learning. Study was a precursor to action. Gemara learning while the most important (Bava Metzia 32b) was to learn the law to practice the law. The French style went in a different direction. Placing more emphasis on reconciling different texts. Focusing more on textuality than on halakha. 

There are no medieval ashkenazi codes only lost responsa of the Tosafist. Yet despite their innovative hyper-focus on the text, Tosafot’s goal was to reach the correct law. Their commentary was reconciliation but there was a halakhic aspect. Diverting from Rashi to demonstrate the correct law. More textuality was to attain the correct law not engender study for study. The Tosafist study marshalled incredible strides in the Ashkenazi centres that followed as well as its influence on Nahmanides and his school. It was pilpul in the beginning of the modern age that cared for the conceptual mania of reconciliation. It wasn’t about doing halakha but figuring which chemicals go best with other chemicals. It was heavily shunned by Maharshal for its lack of halakhic telos. Pnei Yehoshua and his contemporaries reclaimed study for action through analysing the Rishonim via textuality. Super-commentaries were analysis of the Rishonim to gain the law. While at times it was reconciliation simply not overanalysing. 

Volozhin was the grand-successor of Pnei Yehoshua. Reconciliation was textual and not conceptual. Vilna Goan in the spirit of Maharshal pushed for grammatical derivations. To return to the Gemara and to the Rishonim was to derive from their words not to incorporate something not mentioned. To add elements on philosophical grounds. Brisk revived conceptualism but did so in its own way. Briskers wished to penetrate the heart of the debate not colour in all sorts of farfetched alleged patterns. Conceptualism wasn’t about taking anything to the nth extreme but to analyse it on a micro-level. What is the meta-level of this debate. In a way Briskers went in the opposite direction of the pilpulists. Stripping the shakla vitarya of its important discussion. Instead of deleting the debate chunk as Rif did they omitted it symbolically. The fascination is recognising that sugyas can be characterised. They fill a certain function in the halakhic stratosphere. While this devalues the corpus of textual derivation and in another sense undercuts all previous works by lamenting basic distinction, it formally adopts a coherent duality between two Sages.

Asking ‘what’ is not rhetorical, it is intentional. The details covering the law are concealing its categorisation. In its idealist notions the Briskers formulated a metaphysical web. In a daring way, the conceptualisation cultivated a new paradigm dependent on the halakhic matter. Whether they were learning Menachot or Maimonides, the aura to understand the core of the concept was enlightening. While Rav Chaim eschewed using external criteria (philological skills) his primacy of logic was itself an externality. Instead of placing the text as the point of departure, logic preceded it. It was through logic that the text could be undressed to its bare beauty. To Rav Chaim’s defence it can be argued that Vilna Gaon, Bah and some others were overzealous about textuality. It is one thing to reconcile through the text and another to concentrate on emendations. One letter could alter a reading and potentially even a sugya. The Briskers accepted the text as it was and elevated it. The applied a conceptual axis to the perfected text as they saw it. Conceptualism was in a way spiritualising the Torah. It is not about hair-splitting analyses but truthful distinction..

In line is the question about the dialectical results. Like Tosafot before them and even the Talmud itself, the presence of opposites coexisting was respective of an argument. One side here and a second side over there. There must be some kind of reconciliation. If they both exist they must be classified in separate categories. Tosafot’s challenge to Rashi by bringing a sugya from later on finds textual difference that leads to an exception to the law. The law here teaches this and over there teaches something else. If they both exist, they must both be legitimate. Believing chazal and for the Briskers Maimonides to be erudite in their literary perfection forces a reconciliation. Lo kashya, this is for this and that is for that. The Briskers to a larger extent dealt with Maimonides in this way. Since Maimonides style resembled the Mishnah and the Mishnah to Tanakh the lexicographical or syntactical mimicking is an enclosed literary masterpiece that complements one another. In this sense, chazal nor Maimonides could contradict since their written precision was central to their summation. 

Classification is the inverted Tosafot. Tosafot gathers both texts and then analyses the differences by syntax and context. Briskers already have a priori categories. These distinctions are atoms or molecules. Tosafot subsequently creates a taxonomy through derivation. For Tosafot it would notice the difference between fish and sharks and then create two groups naming them while for Briskers the groups already exist without any human imagination. There is less human initiative insofar as fish and sharks logically are different. Conceptually they are separate entities thus divided into their preordained groups. It isn’t common sense but at the same time the goal is to reach the baseline of simplicity. To be Brisker is to be engulfed in the harmony of a metaphysical conception. The bare minimum of differentiation is an obvious dialectic. Rav and Shmuel disagree conceptually. It is not a textual marker, they have separate beliefs. Going back to R Akiva study is greater vs R Tarfon that action is greater is a conceptual battle. This debate is of little textual significance but the ideology is clear in each voice. 

It does have its limits. Like Tosafot’s model transforming into unrealistic undying pilpul so has the brisker derekh become a little extreme. Focusing so much on conceptualism, logic and depth analysis. Any intense model overused will go rogue. The Rav lamented its overcrowded aspect with many wishing to just drag the lomdus with no care for the emotional side. Like the pilpulists these neo-pilpulists just want a lomdus trip. They desire the profound analysis that enlightens the mind into its crazed extreme. The metaphysic is lost in favour of a thought provoking style of learning. Enjoying the sheer brilliance lusting after its dialectical prowess. There is no concern for the law or the other Mishnayot. The model is good only after mastering the rest of Torah. It ought not to be the first passion. It is a useful tool in one’s inventory but even R Chaim began his analytical revolution after learning the array of Torah. Today finding a Rav Chaim or just wishing to get the meat of the lomdus incinerates the study for action obsessed with study for study. 

The conceptual paradigm gets a bad reputation. Its focus on unorthodox tractates and mainstream logic is out of left field but it is also intriguing. It is a profound model of learning. R Lichtenstein has beautifully extended its use while the Rav’s application to the philosophical world furthers its prowess. The conceptual focus has its lessons but ought not to be obsessed. It is a keen model that needs patience and balance.