Practical Joker

By: Jonathan Seidel

A pragmatic turn to metaphysics  

Halevi’s polemical dialogue became a stream in modern philosophy in rational and mystical worlds. Rosenzweig and Berkovits adopted the former and Heschel the latter. Despite Berkovits and Heschel’s disagreements they both ascribed to the empiricist motif. 

Berkovits’ empiricism is rooted in his doctorate on Hume. A philosopher’s interest takes hold of their philosophy. Soloveitchik to Cohen’s neo-kantianism and Levinas to Heidegger’s phenomenology. Berkovits saw religious events as the backbone of Jewish philosophy. Rooted in historical experience enlightening the nation. Sense perception of divininty as the text conveys the empirical authentication. The biblical event is a paradigm for contemporary experience. The historical event can be reapplied today. 

Heschel in his mystic association also found himself tied to empiricism just not in Humean sense. The divine experience was also welded in historical events over ideas. His world of wonder and awe bring divinity to life. It is no longer an abstract concept but an intimate encounter. He criticised Kaplan's pragmatism. For Kaplan revelation was human discovery while for Heschel it was divine communication. Heschel's empiricism gives way to divine pathos while for Kaplan it is an autonomous decision.  

The empiricist is not novel as its roots precede Halevi. The bible is replete with avenues to experience God. Its foundational asset of looking for God in the world is simple and complex simultaneously. The religious experience is considered the most accepted argument for God as it cannot be deconstructed with logic. Scripture provides an empiricist mentality to study of nature. There is a link between man and God than can be remedied. 

James warned against what he termed radical empiricism. For James, the failure of the British empiricists was the singularity of physical science and the absence of meaning and values. While experience is inevitable the methodical approach is imperative to the totality of empiricism. We do not only see factual data but also factual purpose. The subjective and subversive nature of empiricism overlooked the human perspective. Dewey and Russel followed in his critique. 

Heschel’s experientialism does not fit James’ definition. It does inversely present a world stipulated. Heschel propounded experience as the basis for religious connection. The feelings of wonder and awe preceded rationality. His openness to the world internalising it broadens man’s horizon. Yet, Heschel also provides false hope. His mystical wonder though inspiring does not measure to the objective nature. It is a subjective encounter. An individualised sensation. He presents a hyperreality of divine presence. Despite his mystical roots, he calls God the ineffable in the transcendental clarity. Man feels God’s presence honestly and openly. Man simply must open his heart to God’s entrance.

Berkovits’ empiricism turns to pragmatism. Though he never quotes James or Pierce, his thought follows their lead. His rationalism deeply differs from the mystical motif. His experience is rooted in logical phenomena. He does not refer to his emotions but to the traditional sources to compose a method of connection. The pragmatic faith seeks utility as well as influence. It is not faith for the sake of faith but faith for the sake of Yiddishkeit. Faith in revelational relationship fosters deeper connection and purpose. Purporting a dialogical presence through the generations. It is faith leading to the moral law that is exploited to the faithful recipient. 

Goldman is another orthodox pragmatist with a halakhic focus. He acknowledges God’s transcendence and thus unknowability, yet places more focus on man’s limitations. He calls his faith non-illusionary faith meaning that the believer accepts reality as it with its limits accepting the gap between man and God. Religious experience is not the foundation of faith. Instead it is the law binding the faith. It is experiential value in the law validating faith. Yet, he formulates logical assumptions as the basis for faith over experience. The law is the starting point of practical activity that empowers the experience. His pragmatism denies a leap a more a return.      

Ross takes a negative stance towards pragmatism. Pragmatism is self interest and not cognitively persuasive. The utility cannot hold a foundation insofar as its influence is consistent. The Neo-pragmatists are even more problematic in their rejection of the beyond. Rorty specifically is responsible for this trend. Though she accepts the language game it is less autonomous and anthropocentric than Rorty. Ross believes metaphysical statements are important for what they convey than their function. Instead she opts for a linguistically modified Kookian mystical model. Her mystical metaphor provides a supernal description God and man. 

Despite her mystical affiliation, she takes Kook further through figurative explanations. Though she inclines toward mysticism, it is riddled with pragmatic tenants. The mystical formula isn’t a real but an educational model. It is better than basing it on realistic utility according to her but that does not change her pragmatism. Berkovits does the same through revelation. It may stop at divine ontology but it uses a supernal event to characterise pragmatism. The experience draws from the Hassidic transformation of kabbalah to sermonic inspiration. 

Brafman presents the foundationalism and non-foundationalism between Berkovits and Ross using “contingency” and “critique”. Contingency is non-foundational in its justification or revision methodology. Critique moves to test for justification. The modern philosophers of Soloveitchik and Leibowitz are foundationalists who do not justify their belief. Their foundationalism grounded commandants in a non-contingent way. Ross along with Rynhold and Sagi advocate non-foundationalist view sticking to contingency.  They make sense to the committed. There is no critical assessment as it its all about consistency instead of an objective matrix. Novak and Ishrai both present contingency and critique together, justifying in response to doubt. Finding the internal validity problematic and in need of alteration. 

He notes elsewhere that Berkovits shows contingency in his views and would argue his legal decisions follow this spirit. The latter’s pragmatism follows a non-foundationalist mentality according to Humean empiricism. A pragmatist reformer halakhically. The neo-pragmatist is concerned with the linguistic appeal that was not considered by the earlier school. While James and Dewy focused on epistemology, Rorty and Putnam focus on semantic analysis. Rorty’s linguistic focus challenged metaphysics and what is true. The revision necessary from the reinterpretation is uniquely modified from James and Pierce. 

Berkovits’ pragmatism is greatly rooted in halakhic action. The link is bolted shut but works for a selected amount. For those who do not ascribe to the law, are left out fo the picture. For Goldman also, the law becomes the mechanism to utilise faith. They cannot be disconnected. The shift in the moral order is through the legal fascination. As long as the law remains the ultimate thrust, Judaism continues. For many Jews today this is not the case. Many have abandoned and assimilated away from the legal authority. 

Pragmatism centralises praxis as the focal point of identity. It is the commitment to the law as the verifying exponent. The past events are markers of educational prowess over historical means. It is the post-metaphysical aura that is less about its negation and more about its indifference. The cultural matter is apparent but it need not be literal. Though Berkovits nor Goldman need to be sucked into Rorty’s limitations. The hermeneutic extends beyond the scientific rationality to transcendent values and a deity. Language is not subject to the positivism nested in Rorty’s border but the indeterminate beyond.

Returning to the forefathers of pragmatism: Pierce and James. Pierce a rationalist and James a mystic. Both wrote on religion and Pierce was a believer as well. Pierce saw metaphysics as a pragmatic function to the communal cohesion. He was more rationalistic and realistic than James and Dewey. Religion provides valuational answers. James was a mystic marking the ineffable as a central characteristic. He authenticated mystical experiences by their utility and posit outcome. The idea of pragmatism is the positive consequence from the engaged activity. The choice of perspective varies by person and yet arrive at the same result. 

Bringing back Heschel, his similarities to Berkovits do not deny their pragmatic approach. Heschel is more on the pathos track but his awareness of the experiential markers exponentially enhance the believers world. Though a mystic, he profoundly connected the law but saw the narrative as a corollary to the law. His approach to mental capacity to appreciate awe and sublime is tremendously empowering. Faith was found in the stimulation of the self; in a renewed outlook of the world. He tapped into an Akivian mindset of providing deep layered meaning to the simplest of aspects. Like Berkovits, he rejected Cartesian foundationalism and opposed the medieval philosophical trope.    

The ardent believer and sceptic can find pragmatism as the necessary medication for their disheartening faith. Berkovits and Heschel sample the pragmatic hope in the rational and mystical layer. The utility is not a fleeting moment but an undying commitment. A recognition of value and order for the soul. An autonomous decision with principled arrangement. Each event administers empirical value internalised and expressed wholeheartedly. Though Heschel may have a few choice words for Berkovits, there is a utilitarian telos in Heschian prophetic philosophy. 

In a brief tangential postscript, Pierce’s pragmatism also defends Ross’ theological vision. Raposa coins theosemiotics as the divine semiology in the religious framework. This mechanism also supports Ross’ theology. Her mysticism as metaphor is sign-interpretation or what I call “fictionality”. The metaphysical enterprise becomes real personified to the believer. Pierce goes further than Ross in advocating its realness. There is a genuine manifestation. It is not an abstract construction but an identifiable exposure. Its not just function but meaning as well. Pragmatism in this sense need not be activity but reliance. The symbol remains, its meaning changed. The text gives a starting point but the interpreter engages the text confidently.    

Accordingly, It is not James’ mystical experience that captures Ross’ thought but Peirce’s linguistics. Following Ricour’s hermeneutic phenomenology (both men were religious), he like Rorty accepted the cultural-linguistic critique textually manifesting communal life. Yet, he diverged from the latter in promoting ontological significance. The intentionality accounts for the individual’s motivation and hermeneutical attachment. Giving way to ending the literalist ploy in metaphorical relay beyond the Wittgenstein trap. Peirce’s quest for objectivity and truth consensus finds its ally in Riceour’s phenomenology. Ross’ quasi-hasidic mysticism employs semiological significance to the metaphysical.      

Berkovits’ pragmatism does not cower from theological discussion. Unlike Soloveitchik and Leibowitz, Berkovits does speak of God himself positively based on religious lingo. The revelational encounter is central to the veracity of religion. It is this encounter that imparts the subsequent divine “ontology” to man. God’s accessibility following that encounter manifests metaphysical elements. While God hides from man to ensure the latter’s free will, revelation speaks to God’s  will. God’s essence or ontology can never ascertained. Though Berkovits linguistically holds a middle ground, he accepts the limits of the description.        

Neo-pragmatic responses need not be identical to Rorty’s definition. Yet even if so there is no need to uphold Rorty’s cultural-linguistic limitations. Rorty’s vision rejects metaphysical structures asserted through James and Dewey. It also differentiates between pragmatic realism where realities of science and reining are indicative of truth. For Rorty and Davidson, knowledge is a communal communicative hermeneutical system. It is creating knowledge through subjective universe. 

Rorty’s truth is linguistic but Putnam’s isn’t on par with it. He recognises the communal element but isn’t willing to dive into subjective hole. There is an idealised justifiability that pushes for objectivity instead of rampant relativism. Berkovits holds to pragmatic and theological realism. There is a truth that stands beyond the current frame, the idealised community is the sole interpreter. The biblical text is the idealised community written by God and halakhic truth is the improvement process. Its all in relation to reality. Absolute truth is beyond human comprehension and so man deals with the “earthy truth”. It is the truth we are dealt with that we utilise.