Defensive Manoeuvres

 

By: Jonathan Seidel

Dogma as a polemical agent

The emergance of dogma in each of its strands from medieval to modern has been a polemical charge. The teleological element to defend against the warring threat. Taking Kellner’s position that the Mishneh in Sanhedrin that lists the “dogma” is polemical sectarian-wise need not avail itself of its dogma according to Berger. Influence does not negate reality. Thus whether or not dogma were original or invented the polemical charge stands. Islamic influence and Jewish danger impassioned scholars to defend Judaism through issuing dogma. Despite the elitist intellectual battles, it is sufficient to say that these positions were known or transmitted by to public. Hasdai or Albo’s philosophical communication was sermomnically transferred to the people (though this conjecture given their posts and their rationales behind their investment, it would be rather difficult to construct principles without anyone to understand).   

Maimonides does not mention his rationale for writing the dogma and he even writes it in his commentary to the Mishneh which was not a polemical book nor was it a dogmatic policy. Yet, in his commentary, he  elucidates these points as the foundation of Judaism. Following the comments in Mishnah, it is possible he is just writing a dogmatic list as a Jewish necessity, yet no one else does this. Though it may be connected it seems the first measure is for himself. Perek Helek was his own metaphysical formulation while his repetition is modified ever so slightly in his code. This slight modification is intentional. While his commentary was his own, his code was for the masses. In his intro to the Mishneh Torah he writes that he was writing due to religious decline. Subsequently he raises the issue of dogma. The near obvious structure is to salvage Jewry. Halakhic practice is important but foundational tenants are also imperative. Maimonides’ move was politico-religious in arming Jews with a series of beliefs but these were not some transmitted from Sinai residue. 

Maimonides’ principles lay dormant for many years and it was only in Ran’s school that they re-emerged. Hasdai was the ardent anti-Maimonides. He attacked every fabric of Maimonides work and due to the difficult situation never completed his own halakic codex. Given this goal, it is possible he would have reached the principles anyways. Though there seems to be a link between the religious difficulties and maimonidean blame to begin with. Yet, Hasdai also begins his Or Hashem with principles. Living at a time of Jewish crisis, he formulated his principles as a defence. He also went for an intellectualised model that was clearly beyond the grasp of the average Joe. Hasdai already dealt with refuting christian principles before writing his magnum opus. So in a maimonidean way it is not simply the phrase to understand but the depth of the principle. It is a political move to promote the ideal character and Jewish affiliate. 

Albo was similar to his teacher Hasdai. Albo’s partiicapton in the Tortosa disputation among other polemics charged him to articulate his own dogmatic structure. Albo regulated his list to three over twelve. In polemical manner it is more concise and simpler for the average Joe. It is an easier ideal to reach. Albo’s tri-dogma was nested in rabbinic literature. The philosophical polemical usage was for the elite and the masses. The simple people needed a guide to uphold their commitments against the raging creedal christians. The anti-Jewish riots of 1391 were influential to his writing a need to aid fellow Jews in their quest of empowers faith.

Abarbanel is an interesting character given his rejection of dogmas and the time he lived. Abarbanel lived during the expulsion. Dogmas here were irrelevant in maintaining Judaism. The response to the levied attack was to keep hold to the laws. Unlike his predecessors his opponents were not other religions. For Maimonides, Hasdai and Albo Islam and Christianity respectively professed varied dogmas that bound them. Judaism polemically needed its own theology to demonstrate its uniqueness and empower the masses. Abarbanel’s enemy was the coversos. For him, the greatest threat was giving up the Torah not doctrines. His refocus on Torah and halakha was intentional to overcome the religious decline. The inquisition was terribly powerful and converting was a salvation at the cost of one’s Judaism. To this day, many still light Friday night candles without any awareness of their Jewish heritage. Abarbanel held a theology but neglected the principle factor in favour of a wholesale religious articulation, all the Torah is all equal grounds and there is no room for error

Mendelssohn’s opposition to his former Moses is inadequate. He like Abarbanel rejects dogma but praises beliefs in the Torah. He was fighting a similar conversos pandemic. People were leaving for a better modern world. His push for revealed religion and the acceptance of Torah principles was to embolden the law and its unwinded theology. His position was in no way related to the reform movement. He sought to distance the religious from secular. Saving Jews was through holding onto the Torah as a whole. Judaism is dogma-less but not belief-less. Beliefs in the entirety of Torah and practice as critical for Jewish survival. 

Hirsch followed a similar scheme in addressing a dogma-less but belief-full Judaism. Cohesion of Judaism was halakha. Dogma was an abstraction that had little to do with the legal enterprise. He adopted secular study and revelation-centricity as the formate of modern halakhic expression. His Neo-orthodoxy was doxological in its legal supremacy not its dogmatic hierarchy. All principles were important but most was commitment to Judaism as a whole. Hirsch was denouncing reform. Reform rejected the principles but more the law. The law was the trans-generational bind and for Hirsch that was the most essential part. Attacking the law was undeniably viscous and had to be rebounded. 

Hafetz Haim and Feinstein both fought similar battles to Mendelssohn and Hirsch but regarded it differently. They recognised the obsolete manner of halakha in these communities and yet still pointed to the doxology as the main parting company. For them, halakha was linked to the law. Since reform kept to some layer of halakha as did conservative Judaism, their commitment even if negligible could not be framed legally as that could be bounced. Arguing on theological points to demean the other. The supremacy was in the principled people over the wrongful believers. The question wasn’t whether driving on shabbat was so problematic insofar as believing in commutative revelation was a sin. The distinction denominationally was not legal but went to the doxological precepts. To a point that laws forbidding giving conservative Jews aliyot was considered okay because they were not Jewish. They were intentionally marring Judaism worse than those who didn’t believe at all. There is intentional and accidental. 

This denominational polemic has resurfaced in orthodox writers of Parnes, Bleich and Sacks. For them like Hafetz Chaim and Feinstein is to demonstrate the division theologically. The theological disparity is the central issue more than the legal components. It is their lack of acceptance that promotes this agenda. Their supreme orthodoxy is the sole method of religious perpetuity. Discounting other denominations as less or not really Jewish is problematic. This is done halakhically but it is more than that. It legalises the dogma as essential to religious understanding. There is a deep abyss between the denominations.

The polemical charge of dogmas was used against other creedal nations in the Middle Ages. Maimonides, Hasdai and Albo participated in interfaith disputations. The dogmas were a defence in the elitist discussion and a defence for the people. Creed needed to be quelled and defeated with creed. Abarbanel’s fight was different he was fighting internally. His intrafaith battle was to maintain the Torah and halakha at large. He distanced from the dogma as a proper attack. The dogmas will continue to isolate them. Mendelssohn and Hirsch had similar problems. It was the turn of the century that saw dogmas used differently. Ironically, interfaith dialogue became acceptable but not intrafaith. Dogmas were not seen as religiously divisive but tribally.