Realistic Portrait










By: Jonathan Seidel




Rabbinic nominalism: exegesis over legality 


Scholars have pointed out that the difference between Qumran and Pharisees was their attitude toward reality: realism versus nominalism. While Qumranites sought metaphysical phenomena, the Pharisees recognised natural phenomena. This is particularly relevant in the legal realm but it also marks a transition to the geonic rationalism and philosophical nominalism in Andalusia especially in Maimonides’ works. 


Legal nominalism or naturalism is far from denigrating mythical attitudes. It is more concerned with the societal legal application. Law is based on values instead of metaphysics. Logic is the focus of interpretation (though realists may incorporate legal mechanisms). It is their overall realist perspective that gives rise to religious articulation. The supernatural forces in Qumran where utterly irrelevant to the rabbinic mind. The use of metaphysical orientation is anti-naturalistic and proposes a significant celestial notion over the common legal interaction. There is an ontological difference that is meted with legal discrimination at times. Think of Qumran as proto-kabbalists. They constructed a fundamentally supernal form or religiosity. There are notable verses attesting to this divide. The isolated culture does seem to find more affiliation with the nominalistic sector especially matched with the rabbinic naturalists. Yet, it is not as clear. Language can be confusing and even misconstrued. In the seventeen examples Rubenstein relates he finds issue with their synergy in the realistic-nominalistic divide. Finding similarities between Qumran and the rabbis also mitigates a clean separation between the two.


Law is a a societal manifestation. Its mechanics are naturally organised. Its social partition is emphatically present in the common order of the universe. Humans engage in the mortal action. Void of the temple and its supernal ritualism erased the metaphysical notions, solely legally applicable. There his no strike from heaven or consequence either than a legal infringement. The calendar as another example of rabbinic centricity furthered a naturalistic mantra. Exegesis provided a renewed outlook and carving new paths in a post-temple world. The lack of prophecy prompted a social phenomenon to take its place, that being a legal enterprise. Expanding on the oral margins to a detailed life style. To what point is rabbinic literature descriptive writing? Is is solely metaphysical entities? Purity? Or includes court punishments? It is unclear and though it is reasonable to accept a widespread metaphorical acceptance, the naturalistic transition is a lower burden and more probable. Even in traditional circles, the lack of prophetic capability compelled a nominalistic association. Such nominal emergence in rabbinic literature as the Pharisaic opinions were encoded. 


Does breaking the law cause spiritual harm to the universe? The biblical model makes numerous claims concerning reward and punishment. If laws are not followed nationally they will be punished and these punishments are echoed in the prophetic texts. They are a genuine prophetic predication. The lack of mention in rabbinic works testified to a naturalised notion. The classic examples of honouring parents for a longer life can be interpreted metaphorically and makes much sense. Yes, there are occasions of metaphysical reward and punishment but without the direct reciprocity there isn’t much credence to a literal hermeneutic. There is an “as if’ phenomenon in rabbinic legality. Something is quasi-real but quelled of demonic malice. The metaphysical law is a taboo. If a law is overridden it does not hurt their soul or bring them negativity but diverts them to a potential detrimental path. The law methodically conjoins the social path for man. It is a blueprint more than a witch’s spell. Despite the feelings of fear to sinful behaviour, the attitude is not some eternal damnation but a mistaken choice. 


Rabbinic attitudes toward allegories was mute. They were complex and dissuaded from studying. Given their nominalistic inspiration it is seemingly foreign to strip the metaphysical layer for one and not the other. If one is natural the other is natural. The demystification operates in both realms. The geonic approach was not so novel given the switch in rabbinic feelings toward the system at large. How far does this go back? Uncertain. Yet, the evidence presented by the rabbinic nominalists points to a naturalised approach to reality. The sages offered theological-celestial ideals but that fantastical stories involved alongside their legal naturalism is complicated. Either they continued to believe in these myths or they were utilising them for educational purposes. The narratives mean more than their realism.  


The sages’ legal concentration prompted their extensive rational theology. Their legality is exceedingly rational in its own right. Yet the narratives as well prove this point. Hillel’s logic though contested has an immense influence on later scholars. Moses versus Korach is legally bound but rationally argued. R Gamliel ousts R Joshua on Yom Kippur based on his reasoned conclusions. The snake oven is the most profound rational case of human over divine call. Though mythical creatures and miraculous stories persist in talmudic texts, many other stories attest to a naturalised rational reality. The law at the forefront, mitigates the mystical elements for concrete actualisation. It is entirely plausible there was still disagreement in the talmudic era but there was at least a legal naturalism and a growing philosophical one as well. In both the talmud and exegetical texts. The geonic rabbis did not invent this or pressed by islamic counterparts. They exoterically conveyed the talmudic sages’ intent. It is really all metaphorical and valuational. 


The esoteric charm to rabbinic literature was its usage of allegories. The legal narration of its dominant visualisation of law flushes out its complimentary nature to the legal atmosphere. It promotes a realistic portrayal of the ideal law. The law permits a certain action but does not mean one should do said action. There are multiple examples but it is important to recognise the linkage of narrative to law. The dialogical cohesion between law and allegory further cements the rationality of the law. The law is conceived and argued but rationally it is not one to take advantage of. Though there are many examples of stand-alone celestial material, it is usually in an interpretation of scripture. Rabbinic esotericism was less theological insofar as it diminished allegories as legal aids. Though in affirming the legal nominalism the sages also may have held an even more radical philosophical nominalism. Due to linguistic incomprehension, it is merely conjecture. What can be accepted is: the sages were legal nominalists, they protested allegorical explanations, allegories were equated with legal fashioning as a handmaiden of sorts. Their naturalism was apparent and fuelled rational succession. 

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