Medieval Displeasure

By: Jonathan Seidel

Crescas’s non-maimonidean philosophy: a third avenue in quasi-halevian anti-rationalism

Hasdai Crescas like Maimonides was the leader of the Spanish community in Aragon. Though a famed talmudist under the tutelage of Ran and judge alongside Ribash, none of his Talmudical works are available. His philosophical work: Or Hashem is a profound study against Maimonides rationalism and codification. While Abarbanel tried to defend Maimonides, Crescas sought to fight him. Yet both their philosophies were predominantly novel in their own rights as not particularly rational nor mystical. 

It is quite unfortunate Hasdai has been lost to history among the orthodox. The Renaissance Jews only learned the Andalusian scholars and omitted Hasdai’s relevance. Yet, his purpose is still critical in the history of Jewish philosophy as non-mystical anti-maimonidean rationalism. His intellectualism was very apparent and proceeded to further his clause. In a way the best way to defeat Maimonides was not by claiming mystical realism which would be rejected on imagination and cannot be proven otherwise. Hasdai cleverly bought into Maimonides’ frame and rejected his radical rationalism. There are mystical elements but as religious thinker, he was closer to Nahmanides than Abulafia. 

For all the anti-maimonidean ideology, no one came close to criticising Maimonides as Hasdai did. He criticised Maimonide’ philosophy, dogma, and codification. Every aspect was put under a microscope and attacked. Unlike the radical mystics, for Hasdai the goal was not to deconstruct everything, it was to redirect it. Hasdai was a fan of each of Maimonides’ ideas conceptually but not the details. He advocated for all three but in his own way. His revolutionary perspective sought to systematically replace Maimonideanism with a better version. His thought demonstrated a coherent pro-philosophy empiricism. Though he never wrote a book to replace to Mishneh Torah due to prevailing circumstances in his time, his notes against its codification are clear and demonstrate a willingness to construct an alternative. 

Hasdai proved God by experience harking back to the biblical narrative. The narrative demonstrates an emotional bond between Abraham and God. To place logic at the forefront is to mitigate the reality of divinity. It is not something necessary of approval but recognition. Though by his time much of medieval philosophical proofs were becoming inerrant. Still he did not shrink from the challenge of the modern age. He engaged the scientific consensus of his age and produced numerous findings.

His critique was against Averroes’ Aristotelianism. Science was changing and rationalism was not holding up anymore. Though it is unclear what his true intent was. Did he really think Maimonides’ erred or that his thought was dangerous? Nevertheless, he decided to divide science and religion, reading them on their own terms. Science should not be a barometer for Torah. Philosophy and Torah would be aligned but philosophy was limited in its ability to explain the whole Torah. Revelation is the special over-philosophical identity. 

Hasdai presents a starling traditionalism infused in the mimicry of Maimonidean philosophy. His first treatises concern his principles of divine existence unity and incorporeality. His literary structure is polemical. He begins with congruency and quickly moves to divergency. He ascribes positive attributes to God and a personality. His philosophical articulation metes out the seemingly epistemological claims. His use of the jargon speaks to the roaring intellectual convinced by maimonideanism. His god was one of goodness love and grace. He philosophically opposes the singular intellectual mark. Love of God is the philosophical cornerstone of human elevation. Though ironically takes a backseat to the centrality of creation. Revelation tops creation, even an eternal world is necessarily subdued by divine impression. 

Like Nahmanides’ empiricism, Hasdai accepted demons and other supernal creatures. He also conceded to possible other worlds. His empiricism as it related to the Torah notably literally interpreted many of the allegories. He like Nahmanides’ as a descendent of the great sage, took a hardline biblical science that he philosophically justified. This is not all shocking given his school of thought. His teacher, Ran, was a student of that school but like Ritva and Rashba before them, were no mystics. They were Torah scholars who taught it philosophically. 

This model sparked a anti-maimonidean that spread through religious philosophy. Though Maimonides played a major role in maskilic writings their humanistic articulation is a mere perversion of his Aristotelian feelings. Even those today who uphold Maimonides disingenuously void the Aristotelian ideology. Maimonides’ will forever be the debt that future Jewish philosophers pay tribute. Whether agree or disagree, his influence is paramount. It is the starting point of debate. Hasdai took Nahmanides further and engaged Maimonides but strictly posited a non-mystical outlook. There are mythical elements but it is more philosophically analysed then his predecessor. This opened the door for his successors of Albo, Abarbanel, Spinoza, Shadal, Hirsch till Soloveitchik and Kook. Each of these subsequent scholars looked to Maimonides for inspiration and deviated from his ideology. There are points of agreement but there is a substantial disconnect from his radical rationalism. 

Maimonides’ spirit was not and has not been destroyed just at times reconfigured to fit a certain model especially with the scientific revolution. Some thinkers like Hasdai and Abarbanel met Maimonides head on. It is thus not shocking that the latter’s supporters either were century old loyalists or emerging ashkenazim. The ashkenazim who had been outside the fold for too long needed a point of reference. For them and their successors especially in the maskilic and Hasidic camp was to respect Maimonides. They did engage his thought directly. They drew philosophical and scientific inspiration from him. Their commentaries were misguided in professing philosophy with a silent maimonidean witness. This approval in a sense went to approve philosophical study over accepting Maimonides. The ashkenazim read Maimonides conservative against his “radical” provencal students. Abarbanel and Arama are mostly guilty of this. 

It was only years later that Shadal attacked maimonidean philosophy. He was followed reluctantly by Hirsch. The fury of Shadal reflects Hasdai’s intent. Hirsch does not do more than void Maimonides in his 19 Letters. He offers an alternative instead of a direct polemic. Berkovits does a similar Hirschian critique. Mentioning a problem with Maimonides, briefly announcing an alternative or a rereading and then moving on. Soloveitchik shares his displeasure with some of Miamonides’ opinions but does not go as far as necessary. Wyscholgrod is the sole orthodox thinker who has vehemently attacked Maimonides for what he actually believed. Like Shadal, he attacks Maimonides for his demythologisation and Aristotelian imagination and he equally supplies a radical Jewish philosophy. Ironically, Maimonides greatest critics had some extreme positions of their own. Hasdai accepted the possibility or the world’s eternity, Abarbanel argued Moses wrote Deuteronomy, Shadal stated that the rabbis invented oral law and Wyscholgrod pushed a biblical Judaism. These are only the non-mystics involved.

Hasdai does present an alternative though I doubt any of the modern writers accept the mythical avenue Hasdai promoted. Their philosophy is highly existentialist and voids the empiricism so apparent to anti-maimonideans. The measure of acceptable philosophy is one that follows traditional religiosity. Philosophy must align with scripture as the point of departure. Philosophy is the handmaiden to Torah and is a method to better understand the world. Sacks and Shagar both formulate formative theologises to further Yiddishkeit. The goal is to use philosophy to aid humanity than solve conundrums. Both these thinkers allude to Maimonides but do not feel obligated to monitor his thought. Maimonides is what he has been regarded: a revolutionary turned inspiration. The contemporary thinker need not meddle in his Aristotelian ideology. Hasdai demonstrated un-mystically, the ability to be philosophical and not maimonidean. Much of Aristotle has been dismissed by the world at large. His battle is long dead, it is the contemporary challenges, reinvigorating his spirit that is necessary. 

Hasdai’s novelty is so impressive and so important. His anti-maimonideanism is not a rejection of all but a redirection. Maimonides fight was religiously and scientifically problematic but that can be solved. His reinterpretation was furthered into a modelled synthesis of Maimonides’ rationality and modernity. Meaning most moderns reject demonic existence but don’t hold to Aristotle or find value in the allegories by metaphorical lessons. Maimonides will forever be hailed as the hallmark Jewish philosopher but his philosophy no.