Literal Lemons

By: Jonathan Seidel

Did Yavneh take place?: Taku’s aggadic literalism and orthodox dogmatism

French Judaism is notorious for its deviation from the geonic-Andalusian school. Though Andalusian Jewry had its own mod of deviation in appointing student successors over sons and deriding geonic innovations. Andalusia meant to limit rabbinic authority in order to salvage enthusiastic study which had digressed due to the dynastic legacy. Still peshat, textualisation and talmudism were all foreign to the geonim. 

Each of these inventions had a profound effect on the future of Judaism. The textualisation prompted them unparalleled power. This was furthered by Nahmanides school but the French rabbis were perceived as the top scholars and their legal innovations were motivated by a certain elitism. Their peshat commentary moulded well into personifying quite radical positions.  

Kanarfogel notes that most Tosafists did not appeal to anthropomorphic standards nor did they promote the maimonidean controversy. Bechor Shor and Ri’s opinions though in line with Maimonidean thought did not crossover. Nor can Moses of Councy or Yehiel of Paris be considered anti-maimonideans. There is seemingly a single French Tosafist involved in the controversy that of Samuel of Falaise. He hailed from the pietist mystical affiliation that saw deep problems with Maimonides’ rationalism. The talmudists were not fans of Maimonides’ philosophy but they respected his legal crux. The controversy was deeply sephardic motivated. 

Moses Taku professed an atypical yet precedented position that attacked rationalism and mysticism simultaneously. He was against Maimonides and the pietists. His theology positioned a seemingly corporeal God but not a dogmatic approach. His conclusion is based on his talmudism. Taku took peshat to the next level. Following in literal sense, the semantic interpretation of allegories provide an anthropomorphic outlook. This is not the mythos of Yehuda HaChasid but is a translation of aggadah. Bechor Shor’s study of Maimonides falls just short of Taku’s respect. 

Taku’s aggadic affiliation was not a novelty amongst his peers. The Tosafists engaged heavily in aggadah and even brought proofs to their legal claims from such material. The Tosafist school applied its own version to the aggadah, one the Spanish disagreed with. There is a note of Rashi’s mystical association yet this does not take away from subsequent literalist trends afterwards. Rashi responds to many aggadot while Tosafot reserves their commentary to legal aspects. Though we cannot take their silence as accepting anthropomorphism because of its belief element we can take their silence of commentating as accepting literalism. Ironically, it is aggadic literalism that precedes biblical literalism. Rashi began this model and applied to the more anthropomorphic status. Whether or empirically or mystically, there is a mythologised notion that is against Andalusian tradition. 

Though it may be true that the pietists did not present exoteric teachings of anthropomorphic caliber, esoterically they did and their divine included other layers of magic. Despite such a non sequester with Maimonides does not find affinity given his utter rejection of magic and myths. Nahmanides pulled from these and influenced him but did not last. Their move away from anthropomorphic expression did not negate their supernal acceptance. So divine bodily approbations is wrong but not Moses’ enormous height. 

The grand irony is the selectivity on what is considered literal and what is not. For all of Maharal’s aggadic dogmatism, he too voids anthropomorphic ideas. Where does one draw the line? To borrow Maimonides, his scientific quasi-naturalism committed him to allegorise the first stories of Genesis. Their out-there type mentality and mythic vibe are sufficient in his eyes. Many would disagree but his line is Abraham. For medieval ashkenaz, it was anthropomorphism. The pietists accepted the magical aspects and supernal allegories were taken literally. This is an interesting line. The character of demonology is accepted on the same line as Akiva returning home with twenty-four thousand students. On the hand for Maimonides, is it only the unscientific that he absolves or even the story of Yavneh? His lack of aggadic commentary and tendency for philosophical valuation bodes more with a metaphorical association. 

The early maimonideans inclined toward aggadic as sermonic and philosophically enlightening. Levi ben Abraham wrote a treatise on midrash and aggadic interoperation, Abraham ben Maimonides wrote an intro to study aggadah and Moses Ibn Tibbon wrote a systematic philosophical interpretation of aggadah. Their philosophical push garnered attention and criticism. It was Levi who was sole target of Abba Mari and Rashba’s polemic. The peshat ideologues lamented the maimonidean reading philosophy into the text. Their parable like reading was foreign to the literal narrative. Though the same charge was not unhinged at kabbalists who formulated similar responses. 

For the maimonideans, aggadah was a powerful and necessary element of study. His legal codex had its fair share of aggadic material. Though it is blatantly unclear how far he was willing to go. The celestial unscientific strata was reinterpreted but was about the average stories? It seems the historicity is as plain as day. It is only the supernatural skin he wishes to shed. The talmud is a combination of natural and supernatural factors or for him natural and allegorical areas. Much of the natural aggadah is affixed to the law which has more realistic consequences than the celestial remarks. Still this is not absolute and there are metaphorical manners in which Maimonides would concede like Rabba killing R Zeira and reviving him over the law of drinking on Purim.  

The Tosafists to the Maharal accepted the literal stories as true. Maharal literally interrupted the metaphysical manner but even so the continuous literal theme runs rampant in orthodox circles. It is Nahmanides who provides an interesting outlook. The man who couldn’t let go of his heritage wishes to accept the literal sense with the new world of Tosafot but also must allegorise for a symbolic meaning like his Spanish tradition. It was the Spanish tradition that continued the aggadic prominence. Isaac the blind’s students Ezra and Azriel of Gerona both wrote mystical works on aggadah (though am uncertain if they took a literal position). Outside Nahmanides camp, the provencal kabbalists their interpretations were allegorical but unsure of their literal exposition.

It is noteworthy that none of the aggadic works were of ashkenazi hand. It was only with rise of asheknazi scholarship with Rema, Maharasha and Maharal that got the ball rolling. Since aggadah was used for something other than legal ramifications, it was irrelevant to ashkenazi scholars. It is thus not shocking that a Maharal the revolutionary ashkenazi thinker pronounced such a radical ideal. The ashkenazi engagment with philosophy and aggadah is firmly captivating. The Ein Yakkov was sentimental in producing an anthology on aggadah from Maharsha to Ramchal. Much ashkenazi work yielded an explosion of intellectual material from commentaries on the Guide to commentaries on Rashi. 

There was brief stint of religious philosophy but aggadah was marginalised in the volozhin. Halakha was the primary actor. The hasidim drew on allegories to promote their visions like the Kabbalists did. The maskilim rejected and reinterpreted in a maimonidean manner, while Hirsch and Shadal did preserved their importance. Soloveitchik is a prime example of a scholar who shunned allegorisation. Soloveitchik hailed philosophy but found little interest in aggadic study. Lieberman is famous attributing Jewish theology to the details of halakha. Kook and Heschel are the first to really engage with the aggadic portions. Kook’s Ein Aya is a kabbalistic commentary on the aggadic portions. Yet, Kook like Nahmanides attributed a literal and symbolic interpretation of the aggada. It is only with the academic world that Andalusian allegorisation reappears.

Angel notes that some of the allegories are basically accepted myths: vashti having a tail or R Joshua stole the Angel of Death’s sword. Some of the most fantastical relics are read and accepted. Maimonides would have none of it but I also believe that like Maimonides, Angel would accept the Yavneh story or the tales of R Akiva. It is the celestial, unscientific that are replaced, even the miraculous are subject to dispute. 

This though in turn opened the floodgates for academics to deny all narratives outright. Maimonides played a dangerous game, owning all to science but this scientific-centricity may come back to haunt his legacy and the future of Jewish observance. If archeology poses otherwise then maybe it is all made-up. This has been the orthoprax nature of much of contemporary religiosity. Many academics who struggle with the accuracy find a tribal communitarian reason to remain committed. Leibowitz famously abrogated religious facts for religious values. That was only the beginning. 

Recently, Lau wrote a five part biographical series of the sages which in part has cryptic legends to real life people. He has humanised many of the characters from Hillel to Akiva to Shmuel to Rava. Pulling from various midrashim, he locates their stories. To give but one example. The culmination of various sources culminates in a biopic of R Eliezer ben Hyrcanus as a wealthy ignoramus who was inspired by R Yochanon received his father’s blessing became a more traditional Shammaite and refused to innovate halakha. The lifestyle and legal style are combined to provide an overview of the sage.   

What does this tell us? The maimonidean trend is helpful insofar as we are cognisant of our developments. There is no reason to reject the authenticity of R Eliezer ben Hyrcanus. Is it possible he wasn’t real? Sure but it is irrelevant. Especially under the maimonidean guise the author of the law is completely irrelevant. The constitutionality of the law and its acceptance are primary. The academic frame has provided numerous  measures. Wimpfheimer’s legal narratives tremendous. The aggadah becomes a valued realistic visualisation of the law. When the law says husbands can leaves their wives to learn and then the narrative tells of multiple husbands’ demises for overstaying, is clearly a message involved. Did they really die? Did Raba really kill R Zeria? Did R Hanina ben Dosa really ignite vinegar? The answer is I don’t know. The basic literalism without the message and the marginalisation without the model is dubious. Kook probably is best at articulating this in his Ein Aya. The story’s are more than their factuality, their fictionality is a symbolic message and lesson to hone. 

For more on the power of aggadah and relation to halakha see: Extra Tactics