Medieval Monism

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By: Jonathan Seidel

Ancient Daas Torah: the anti-maimonideans--lo tasur as a test case 

Faur’s anti-maimonideanism follows a historical record. According to his analysis it was the philosophical impulse that garnered opposition in a kabbalistic twist. The Kabbalistic mantra was championed with a uniform hierarchical dogmatism. Yet, much of their reaction was built on a rabbinic elitism. Wein argued that daas torah has always been part of Judaism but here it is argued as a counter response not an inherent origin.   

Daas Torah is an ideology that centres all religiosity under one sage. The sage is the ultimate authority. The charismatic authority maintains a sharp hold on the community. Originating in the nineteenth century with the rise the agudah against reform and culminating in its strictest form following the destruction of European Jewry. Pegging off of Hasidic lore the tzaddik has supernal wisdom to decide the divine will. This is not limited to legal queries but to every facet of life. A hierarchy of elitism emerged compelling slavish servitude. It commanded a certain ideology. The authority in his particularist philosophy opined his views forbidding non-legal aspects in embellishing a specific orientation. 

The source of daas torah is not the talmud but the rishonim. The anti-maimonideans primarily the tosafists and sephardi kabbalists railed against Maimonides. They gave themselves unparalleled power by explaining the talmudic text in their favour. Following the tosafist school which for many of their conclusions predated Maimonides. Yet, their successors latched onto this elitism supplying them with unique opposition. Maimonides triggered the first incident of daas torah. The banning of his books and the censorship culminated in a strict hashkafic mentality. 

The core of centralising religious authority originates in the rule of “lo tasur”—the law of listening to the rabbis (Deuteronomy 17:11). There are two variations: the Sifre states that the court is the final authority and no deviation is permissible. The Yerushalmi posits that one does not follow the court until they legislate the correct law. There are various ways of reconciling these views given that the Yerushalmi is talking about a sage or absolute certainty. Rashi ignores the Yerushalmi quoting the Sifre, obligating one to follow no matter what. Nahmanides furthers Rashi’s view with a handicap that at times it may be necessary to override the court. Nahmanides places the court as the supreme. The Kuzari takes a similar approach giving the court absolute power. Alternatively, Maimonides position limited the power solely to the great court. No post-talmudic has grand authority. 

The rise of the maimonidean movement restricted the power of the sage by offering a go-to guide for the layman. This threatened the authority of the rabbinate. Maimonides was positing his own authority against traditional transmission. There was an arrogance to the anti-maimonidean mindset. Only they could understand the law and teach it to people. Maimonides in a sense empowered the people. Maimonides believed that all post-talmudic authority was void and anyone raising themselves at the expense of genuine tradition was corrupting it. Though he failed to quote his sources, his exegesis does pull from rabbinic literature. Maimonides position in the Mishneh Torah reflects the persistence of oral tradition. He became more and more infatuated with the court’s capacity. Whether or not it was motivated philosophically, in the guide his conception of the high court is the supreme that harkens to a textual postulation. The court had prescriptive abilities. It and only it acts accordingly. Every subsequent scholar was beholden to the talmudic text not individualised scholars which angered the anti-maimonideans as his philosophic guide stripped them further of their authority.   

The anti-Maimomnidean movement began in southern France in the purview of tosafist philosophy. A few French opinions will demonstrate the weaponisation of this perspective to witch hunting. Rashi’s position on never deviating from the court already mentioned applies to a normal judge though even if this is speculative it was utilised my the Nahmanides to grant great power to contemporary courts. His successors Ran (derush 12) and Sefer Hachinuch (#508) also agreed with this move as well. Another example is the history of oral law. The tosafists solved the dilemma of elu v’elu with the midrash that at Sinai God gave Moses forty nine reasons for yes and for no per rule (Sanhedrin 17a). Every law is predated, it is upon the court to decide which reason to give. There is no such thing as a new law, the court is exercising what had already been legislated. Every novelty was told at Sinai. Nahmanides school followed this view into their following the sages no matter what from its god given right. The third aspect is the court’s ability to alter laws. Tosafot Sens argues that the purpose of minority pesak enables the next generation to over turn it (Eduyot 1:4). This is in stark agreement to Nahmanides rationale for publicly punishing the rebellious elder. He is rejecting the supreme power of the court. Ran (derush 12) and Hachinuch (#508) extend the zaken to anyone rejecting rabbinic decisions. Even the kabbalah can be traced back to their corporeality and literal interpretations of mystical elements, detecting an esoterically inclined motivation. 

Nahmanides was a critical anti-maimonidean. Against Maimonides, he praised the French rabbis as masters over all of Israel. Other contemporaries such as R Joseph ben Todros Abulafya and R al-Fakhkhar appeased the French against Maimonidean ideology. Nahmanides subverted halakha for theology in line with a Christianised dogmatic hegemony. He also created new laws like only red wine was acceptable for kiddish as did the Tosafists with clapping on Shabbat and washing after meals. It is possible many of these permissions were to defend common neglect and this was their dialectical justifying gymnastics. Yet, it is irrelevant given the subjective nature of halakha. The permission of martyrdom also unilaterally opposed the talmudic ruling. The rise of canonical law potentially infiltrated the necessity to justify. Canonical law is innovated via dialectical analysis by reinterpretation or supporting texts. Canonical law is at the mercy of the legislator. Rashi preempting the Justinian code argued for halakhic progress and followed further with his descendants the Ri and Rabbenu Tam (#142). With the advent of the controversy, the spirit chose the religious authority. Deriding the exilarch’s role as the secular leader, Nahmanides pushed for absolute authority, all under the religious provisions in line with the reinterpretation theory. Everything was presented to the sages so any innovation is simply in line with the divine will. The divine-picked-individual decides the law the best way for the community.             

The infallibility of the sage in his reflexive subjectivity acquires a certain hegemony and spiritual audacity. The anti-maimonidean train mainly opposed any type of possible error. People follow what the court or sage says. Nahmanides ambiguously argues that mistakes are possible. The two ways of understanding him are either one can act in defiance of the court but once he presents the error and the court disagrees he must comply with them or if he thinks they are wrong he must deliberate and then comply with their answer. The rebellious elder is then the publicist. He is defiant of the court. Historically, Nahmanides may have been okay with Maimonides had he kept his thoughts to himself. No need to purge the unexpressed. Once he did then it was an issue. Alternatively, it was Maimonides job to present his views to the court and he did not. Thus is a rebel since the court disagrees. The power of court coercion transferred to the sage dominated any deviation. Maimonides actions were in stark opposition to the great French rabbis. They were infallible and had to be obeyed. 

Ironically, many of the contemporary advocates turn to Nahmanides as the source of their inspiration. His writing was not a theatrical project but the genuine feelings towards Maimonides. His opinions presented are the linchpin of much of the controversy. His writings represent an authentic moment in history. Daas torah is not derived from rabbinic commentary but from rabbinic positions, from case events.