Textual Euphoria

 

By: Jonathan Seidel

Paradigm shift: existential religious experience to post-liberal textuality 

Religious thinkers have followed in the footsteps of continental philosophy whether it be Buber, Rosenzweig, Soloveitchik, Heschel, Berkovits or Levinas. The twentieth century brought the demise of neo-kantianism and the rebirth of Hegel’s idealism in Husserl’s phenomenology and Satre’s existentialism. This continental strand upholds thinkers such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Many of these names ring clearly in the footnotes of religious thinkers. To a point that the successors of the phenomenological pursuit, the post-structuralists and postmodern thinkers of Foucault, Derrida and Baudrillard, were revamped by Shagar. The echo is mightily deep but names such as Russel or Moore are voided. Only recently has Wittgenstein made headway in Jewish circles in Leibowitz but more frequent in the academic sphere than the religious. There are exceptions like Kaplan seeking more with the pragmatists. Recently, a new surge in religious thinking has pushed to the analytic model prominent in the American sphere. It is not shocking why Jewish scholars have preferred continental to analytic thinking. Firstly, is the location of these scholars. The first group of names mentioned above all grew up in Europe and all studied in Germany, the centre of the idealistic trend of thought. Shagar was born in Israel but the postmodern condition was revamped in his philosophical journey as well as the the affect of globalisation. Many Jewish scholars have sought poststructuralism over analytical models. Thinking of Jewish analytic philosophers like Moore and Putnam though have written on Judaism are not necessarily Jewish scholars. The lack of American Jewish scholarship at the turn of the century voided analytical concerns. Contemporary scholars like Lebens and Segal express Judaism analytically instead of analytic philosophers interpreting Judaism. Additionally, the latter are using the philosophy to explain Judaism. Secondly, the difference is in religious structure. Continental philosophy is concerned with experience, existence and values. This is quite formulaic to religion especially on a spiritual note. The rise of esoteric education jives with the introspective nature of religious affiliation. The model of transcendence and spiritual elevation is broadly connected to continental thinking. Spirituality voids the logical investigation of analytical deduction. Thirdly, continental philosophy following the Hegelian dialectical model is about synthesis. The apologetic aspirations of religious thinkers is muddled in reactionary justification. For many modern thinkers as those mentioned above, they attempted to synthesis Judaism and modernity. Trying to find a middle ground only furthered the idealistic model. Even internally within religion, how the religious individual engages his community is continental in nature. It is not about analysis but a synthesised result. 

It is clear historically why Jewish scholars refrained from analytical philosophy. Its logical motive seems alien to the spiritual mantra. The submission to natural sciences is ignored by the religious. Bergson’s resistance to the perfection of science led to the existentialist thinking of many religious thinkers accompanied with the flavourful spiritual aura. Yet this logical fear was mitigated by Wittgenstein in his linguistics and overturned positivism for cognitive/mind philosophy. Verification has continuously melded the analytic mind and metaphysics meaningless. Still, there has been a growing trend of metaphysical revival following Quine’s ontological commitment. Preying on the linguistic centricity to the topic, he sought metaphysical lingo to be reinserted following the fall of logical positivism. The strengthening of metaphysical notations holds value in preempting religious association. The end of metaphysical denialism seeps into fervent spiritualised expression. 

Jewish philosophy has commonly centred on continental subjects but this is only a recent Kantian response. Medieval philosophy utilised logic as well in rationalist thinking. Maimonides heavily favoured science and pragmatic approach to religious expression upheld a logical realism. According divinity with realistic ideals aligns with the goals of analytic philosophy. This forced concessions of metaphorical events opposing his contemporaries and the text itself. Still, Maimonides was reacting to the Arabic philosophical engagement. The rhetoric may be similar methodologically but it is divergent in teleology. Both prioritised logic but the analytics so much so to denigrate metaphysics. This being that, theology was a given in medieval not so in modern philosophy. Yet, it is ironic that Maimonides and Geronsides’ metaphysics where quite abstract as a way of coordinating religion and science. Still, analytic philosophy has little for apologetic historicity. For example, a mathematical conclusion of the exodus may yield fruit logically that distinguishes from a pure archeological derivation. It is more about ‘what’ questions then ‘why’ questions. Defining criteria and then analysing their depth. Despite predecessors scientific inclination, it is contemporarily more about the use of logic to precisely determine the truth. The primacy of logical analysis via rigorous argumentation is the hallmark of the philosophy. Unlike continental philosophy that produces historical vectors as sociologically imminent, analytic does not. It is a clean slate to argue from scratch. With the metaphysical revival via argumentation, scholars can further their spiritual belt without voiding this mindset.

The idea of logic and argumentation as the core value of representation is ancient to Judaism. The entire halakhic realm is built on rigorous analysis. The pursuit of truth was never on socio patterns but texts before them. The talmud itself has been criticised for its a-historicism whether those sages existed and if they said those statements. It is entirely irrelevant, there is no legitimacy test. It is less about the person and more about statement or the prestige. The reliability hinges on the talmudic account which heightens not the historical but the consequential aspects. Using logic to deduce veracity is plenty legitimate when archeology is weary as well as uncertain. The halakhist follows a more analytical model than the theologian. The affinity to halakhic discourse compounds analysis on the basis of adjudication instead of subjective spirituality. The abstract possibility of the celestial is marred by the concretisation of legal concepts. To take an example that bridges the gap is the laws of purity. It is entirely metaphysical but has realistic concepts. Even if one believes purity is nominalistic, its legal fortitude enables an hyperreal sensation. It is less about the purity sensation and more about the internal language propounding an elevated mindset.  

This model is considerably dearth in the Jewish world. Most scholars hang on to modern Kantian notions or have adopted the poststructural notations. The preoccupation with linguistics has a continental and analytic side. The post-textual community obsesses with the subjective nature of interpretation and derivation. Following the deconstruction and meta-narrative of Derrida and Foucault, they are reactionary in their pursuit of religious truth. They are trying to survive under the current rubric. The issue with this philosophy like its predecessors suffers from a temporary measure. Philosophy persists to develop. Analytic philosophy has also had its shifts but its imperative that we look to see which philosophy is preferred for the current stage of Judaism. A proper critique attacks the constant changing of Jewish philosophy. Philo, Maimonides, Soloveitchik are all different, then again during Maimonides’ time there were multiple versions. Will philosophy always be a reactionary attempt? Will Jewish philosophy ever change? It just might. Yet, there is a difference between the analytic and continental stream. Samuelson notes the methodological differences point the former in a less reactionary camp. Analytic philosophers may respond in such a matter but it’s not to justify in the same way continental philosophy does. If anlaytic philosophers stick to the logical structure it is less about responding to criticism and more about formulating coherent emboldened claims. 

The goal of analytic philosophy is to defend a perspective. My essay on the mimetic shift was not responding to a specific polemic but a response to the author in demonstrating the perpetuated oscillation between the two poles. Yet beyond writing what does this mean for a theology? There is a difference between doing and believing analytic philosophy. To an extent Soloveitchik did analytic philosophy without believing in it. His rabbinics were analytic but his philosophy existential. Still, even if to suggest that his early works were analytical, it is evident his later are existential and are exceedingly personal. Textuality is a good start to demonstrate the key cultural centre of the religious project. It is important for concise argumentation and clarified language. A theological worldview can be clarified without a doctrinal model. Since the system does not advocate it and is more of a Arab response there is no need to accept it though a part of that is historical philosophy but like a debate provides a topic and argues it succinctly. 

        Religiosity becomes an individualistic pursuit to truth. It is not about imaginary feeling but logical expression for classified viewpoint. This is a call for the revival of rabbinic individualism. The talmudic pages are filled with contradictory opinions brought by varied scholars theoretically legitimate. In our case as well, we must analyse our view, for me of late it has been linguistics and mythic anthropology. The notion of symbolic theology seems more logical than the present apologetics. I do go further than most in my agnosticism but nominalistic theology is another extreme version of Maimonides’ metaphorical exegesis. I am more associated with religious praxis than with religious belief. I’d rather ponder concretisation than abstraction. Much of my work is logic of stemming from the topic. Analytical theology is a guided argumentation of the celestial. I’d prefer to stick to the Sages of antiquity even if I broaden my scope a little more.  

        Post-liberal textuality emerged in Christian circles and spread to Jewish academia following the Wittgensteinian and Derridian influences. The linguistic turn first began with Russel and Wittgenstein spawning analytic philosophy. Ironically, in mentioning Jewish philosophy as reactionary, so two where these big philosophies from Kant. For continental philosophy, Heiddeger began the language focus but French structuralism by Saussure in his semiology sparked the enduring quest. Saussuare started a linguistic trend that led to Foucault and Derrida. Much of this linguistic rage was built on subjectivity and experience. On the other side, Wittgenstein sought a linguistic theory based on rules and codes. It was not a free for all. From Wittgenstein, neo-pragmatists emerged with their cultural contextualisation. Neo-pragmatists have a hint of postmodernity in their voices. There is an optimistic tone of what texts convey, their meaning and purpose. The linguistic shift has engulfed philosophy for the past half century but the analytic scholars have moved away from linguistics back to logical presumptions. 

        What is the issue with post-liberal textuality? Ross dislikes it for its apologetics of all apologetics. It is an internal classification of truth. Something is true because it is written leaves out the practical experiential justification. To be fairly clear, given the embellishment of old and how history is written by the victor the seeming accuracy of said claims is questionable. We are unconcerned with empirical truth and more enamoured with textual verification. Yet, post-textuality removes the cognitive sensationalism. It also accepts the pluralistic relativity of truth. Ross’ tirade is powerful. She is correct. My friend Max remarked on the necessity of religious truth. Yet, there is a misunderstanding. Despite the religious-ness of Judaism, it isn’t. It is a nationality with a theocratic origin. This means that the cultural-ontology is the most imperative part. Ross is correct that cultural-linguistic faith has its holes but does so for the wrong reasons. The cultural aspect is not relativistic, it is positivistic insofar as the nation believes it to be true. Yet, there is no experiential motor that attracts divine connection. The experience is sullied by a misunderstanding. Even more so, Ross would only know about God because she has read about him. The average man cannot know God without his intervention into our reality. Unless, Ross is constructing a widely post-Jewish ideology, God is rectified via linguistic interpretation that varies by scholar. She takes the mystical immanent route but such a model differs from other historic complexions. Faith should be cornered in collectivist identity rather than privatisation. Many say that faith is private. Yet, the entirety of identity is predicated on communal validation. The origin of divine knowledge is the book itself. Sensing God is via intellectual speculation. On an intuitive level not an empiricist one. Faithful linguistics is about utilising the text for seeing God in whatever model. Whether be the biblical rabbinic or Maimonidean God. Our faith is concerned with explanatory notions of divinity. 

Yet faith in God has nothing to do with faith in Judaism. This is exceedingly important. Faith is indeed cultural and resembles what each community makes the deity about to be. It is more plausible that we are talking about the same deity with a few tweaks in the mythos. It is our traditions that denote what the God is. Ross’ model wishes to do away with texts for a spirit. Down with metaphysics up with sensations. The connection is salvaged by textual phraseology. A key to meet him. The text is exegetical and can be redescribed to meet the needs of the contemporary era. What does not change is the ontological focus of faith but more valuational expression. Rituals are not pragmatic assertions but ontological necessities. Furthermore, the linguistic thrust aids the sceptic in adopting a purely mythological deity. This also promotes more religious expression as a tribal motive more than a celestial fear. It is an internal matrix conducted under generational linkage. The narratives have greater worth to the overall peoplehood as valuational than simply factual.