Semiotic Synchronicity

By: Jonathan Seidel

 

Intro: Past Faults and Future Success

In my scepticism I was overtaken by socio-historical rationales to authenticate Jewish tradition. Deductively this was a genuine move and traditionally valid. Exposing the external influence on the law prompted a full size view of its origin. For theoretical purposes this was okay. I was only insinuating the larger picture to the genus of these creations. Following certain scholars, I forged practical consequences to the influences. Arguing that authorities deliberately arbitrated by these influences and the impact was obvious. Getting into some deeper water, I then took it to a new extreme stating that because of the absence of these past circumstances in today’s age, laws can be altered. Pinpointing on various accepted halakhic innovations contrary to traditional practice appeared to apply everywhere. 

Seeing R’ Uziel’s landmark female decisions I decided to broaden the scope. Accepting Maimonides’ rationales of socio-historical genus to animal sacrifices due to pagan worship (Guide 3:32). I then spread this to many rituals especially civil law and argued for further changes. In my case, concerning sacrifices I asserted that due to this past rationale and prayer’s present supremacy in its stead, sacrifices potentially will never reemerge. I did not take the reform route and erase everything, I instead located a law with an archaic origin and ethical issues, placed in a halakhic context and deduced diachronically that it had ceased. I carefully examined other past authorities to maintain some legal consistency but historicity was my main pull. I noted the halakhic progression away from the old barbaric models but my legal method was not well backed analytically.

Ever since reading Profs. Jackson, Burnside and Reifman, I have reconsidered the nature of religious law. The principle of legal semiotics offers a deeper insight into legal analysis by maintaining the framework while open to innovation. It starkly advocates ironically but legitimately for tradition and change. Such a mechanistic system is complex but it demonstrates a fascinating analysis of halakhic discourse. In this vein, the rationales are duly noted but entirely irrelevant on a practical level. Their absence from decision making, all the more so supposes its negligence to overall legal thinking. It is taken into account by the adjudicator but ill-mentioned in the scope of legal material as legality is less interested in the historical fluidity and more with the legal linkage. This essay will attempt to re-envision a legal archetype that acknowledges the mythical past yet pronounces its legal language in absolutist fashion.   

Old Dog New Tricks

There is a mechanical framework that cannot be mitigated by emotional reactionary distress. It must be upheld as a measure of harmonious continuity. As well for legislative legitimacy. The question is can we maintain old language with new laws? Can formalist lingo produce innovative rulings? Affirmatively. The interpretative core is the model of perpetual marching. Retaining the system as a whole while supplying a renewed perspective can alter the course of legal action. Depth analysis and honest deduction procures authentic transmission. The biggest mistake is maintaining a sole anti-historical or historical outlook. A pure synchronic or diachronic view is inadequate and destructive. It is not the rule of law or the rule of man but a synthesis between the two. Law is encoded and permanent while humanity is temporary and ever developing. 

Modern theories of law by Kelson Hart or Dworkin miss the mark, they pin a binding force on a system that preceded such a mechanism. Even to assert the ground norm of sorts in divine transmission (even beyond Sinai) is cute theologically but when human participation is present, it does aid in the hermeneutic. A constitutional backdrop is also deriding as the basic norm of religious law cannot be altered. Even if there were principles incorporated, it is not explicit in rulings. Whether meta-halakhic aspects are succinctly added and considered ‘principles’ is debatable. There are obvious additional factors in adjudication but to define them as permanent and binding is clearly overstepping. Even in biblical law where it is clear laws reflect Jewish values of liberty and responsibility are secondary associations, not the prime integrative core. 

Context Matters

Religious language is integral to comprehending tradition. It is on the one hand a divine author and secondly a trans-generational codex. Beyond theology, as long as it is accepted its constitutionality maintains its linguistic rigour. It is the scholarly authority deemed to the revered leader who decides. It is his ruling that is authoritative. Deviancy exists but not on a mass scale. Uniformity and legal allegiance is the goal. Erroneous rulings are at times necessary for order. Yet, if the legal system is seen as a framework for valuational lifestyle there is more than just following orders and a requirement to utilise for a further purpose. To jump from the floor to the ceiling. There happen to be theological motivations for commitment but that need delegitimise the core of legal discourse. Language need not deter us from genuine understanding. The semantic pull to treat literally is a farce and misconstrues systemic legalism. It is the perpetuity of the norm not its ancient rationale. In a sense this historicist model was avoided by rejecting semantic phraseology. There is a deep loyalty to the text and its underpinning association.   

The semiotic value manifests a preclusion from historical sophistication. Contextual derivation is essential but not in discourse. It is theoretically stimulating but plays little heed to the overall adjudicative preaching. There is a quasi-positivistic kernel remaining at the core of the legal system. There is a restricted lace to legality. The language whether encoded text or interpretive tools persists. It is how these are utilised that affects their application. It is a linguistic sphere that plays by its own rules. The courtyard is walled off but light radiating forcing itself penetrating through the wall. Rulings are not anticipated or predicated but the lingo does affect the limited scope of interpretive array. Indeterminacy is central to adjudication as varied factors are incorporated to the final result but that need not divert from an explicit linkage between the two. 

Techno Times

The legal language is fixed but it enables further innovation. Interpretation lies at the heart of semiology. The symbolic investigation of ethical procedures is not inherent to the law. Morality is subsumed not by a systemic religiosity but by a sociological bias. There are ethical terms to be utilised but even they are subject to interpretive plurality. Authorities will deduce diversely in the pursuit of a goal. The original use will be overturned. The classic moral precepts are utilised in non-moral contexts and conflated to facilitate agendas. This is not to undermine their hermeneutical prowess but to engender a distinction from their ethical affinity. The particular telos of these statements is valuational than moral. The distinction between the two, parallels the internal mechanism meeting the external reality. The immutable law vs the mutable society. Yet there is a level of integration that permits dialogue and argumentation. The moral precepts are weaponised by the sages to apply legal affiliation and resolve contradictions not to boast ethical expression. 

Ethics and science are quite intertwined. There is a deep link between discovery and moral growth. It is not a shock that the cessation of slavery occurred around the industrial revolution. Science and law have also been connected. Laws were based on scientific knowledge. There is a congruent systemisation in both systems. Similar to ethics, science has also been subject to change though many have been more willing to concede to scientific change than ethical change. Science, unlike morality, is absolutely distinct from law. Then again many have defended the scientific religious fallacies.

When practice and science conflict there is a deep aversion to conceding the former. Unlike morality, science is not as pressing. Yet, there may be ethical questions intertwined. Science is not just information, it has consequences. Premature death is essentially burying someone alive, inadvertently killing them. If law is at least in Jewish tradition presented as the truth then the possibility of error is minute. Thus conservative legalists who oppose scientific discoveries by inquiring of their predecessors justify it not by accuracy but by an encompassing divine truth. Science deals differently than morality as the natural order is not a decency problem but an abstract issue. Though applicable to ethics as well, semiotics enforces a common-sense strata that contextualises the debate. There is a sincere representation of circumstantial legality.  

Responsive Genius

Social change plays an imminent role in this discussion. How do we relate to these changes? There is a distinct ethical charge. Context is integral to the perpetuity of the systemic linguistic. The inevitable social change compels legal response. Law is innately conservative but it does advance in its alignment with social needs. The signs that symbolise the overarching narrative link the totality of the framework. Signs are interpreted by conventional knowledge. The semantic thrust invalidates the normative sign. The innovation is predicated upon the internality of the system. While reviewing the sources there is a strong sufficiency with self-beliefs. In accordance to a law the sources present or are reinterpreted by their own methodology. Modern lenses on ancient terminology are incoherent. The best model is contesting signs as the credit of rabbinic semiology. 

To look at a few examples of halakhic social change decisions that altered the course of halakha follow R’ Uziel, R’ Goren and others:

1. Autopsies: The Talmud forbids disfiguring a corpse and exhuming it (Bava Batra 154b). Famously R’ Landau argued that it is forbidden to perform an autopsy on the shy likelihood something will be found (YD #210). R’ Sofer further permits the presence of an identical patient. R’ Goren makes a noticeable innovation concerning its permissibility. He redefines the situation (YD #336). For the former two the national health was not at stake. For the sake of Israeli prestige and success autopsies must be executed. Yet it's R Uziel who semiotically paved the way for more lenient discussion. He quotes the same Talmud to exhume to reinforce property. Then draws an analogy to burial delay (YD #1:28). This analogical reasoning plus redefinition of the predecessor’s position and their rationale draws extended illustration. This model presumes that contextually the predecessors were quite aware of the position but in light of different circumstances. R’ Uziel identifies the necessity in light of modern Israel. Laws reflect their society. 

2. Bastard: The bastard child may not ever be nullified. The Torah cannot be erased but the legal ramifications may be mitigated. R’ Goren in the infamous "Langer Case" was liberated to court-deciding bastards. He first found fault with the betrothal—the mother being a gentile—then drew an analogy of bastard with capital punishment quoted the talmud to authenticate his perspective. In both cases a case can be retried to acquit. He adds a moral hermeneutic to solidify his point about saving the oppressed (Pesak Hadin, 13-14). His trifecta of a deduction obliterates the position the children were devastatingly living under. This innovative technique pushes past the earlier authorities. He builds on Tosafot and Rema’s capital punishment definition for a chained wife and applies it here to bastards (Yevamot 122b). He only relies on a rationale for his last point. His creative interpretation derives less from redefinition and more from analogical reasoning. 

3. Kosher Animals: The Bible names all the birds that are not kosher but fails to mention the penguin (Leviticus 11:13-19). The penguin is also not a bird of prey as the talmud notes. The semiotic analysis operates differently here. It is about common sense classification. The bible does not account for penguins but it does count the ostrich even though it cannot fly.  The classification is bird-ish. Similarly, to the ostrich the penguin resembles bird-like animals. Rashi semantically counts the two dozen names mentioned in the torah as the solo non-kosher birds but Tosafot disagrees and argues for a sign (Chullin 61a). The list is characteristic of a type. Thus the penguin fits the criteria of an ostrich and forbidden birds but the turkey fits the chicken standard is permitted. This position seems more tenable than R’ Hirsch’s position that would prohibit turkey because it was part of the reliable tradition, though R’ Karo may permit (YD 82:3). Demography is critical. Though this may hint to a historicist model it does maintain a contextual perspective. Though just as social changes concerning women can change due to suffrage movements so too regarding animals that did not exist in that part of the world. 

Despite the divine coordination there is a deep reflection of the society. The mistaken outlook is to supply an eternal framework to the rulings themselves. There is an obvious canonisation issue that cannot be repealed due to its constitutional setting. We can even equate this as a mistaken decision but nonetheless is the reality. The influence of canon law reinforced this narrative. That being said, even Pentateuchal laws are not necessarily immutable. Despite the erosive aversion does not obviate its impossibility. Female witnesses is a case that may be implausible to uproot. Semantically it is impossible but maybe not semiotically. This is beyond the scope of this essay. 

In each case brought forward the original text is not disregarded but redefined in light of the newfound knowledge. The relation to the text and its applicability is drastically fluid and expansive. It is a synchronic analysis of the totality of religious literature. To demonstrate reverence to earlier diachronic positions but willing to overtake them consequently. There is an equal playing field because development is inevitable while changes vary typologically. 

Other Side of the Wall     

Semiotics is not only a legal measure but also a philosophical measure. Legally and philosophically it opts for a valuational direction. Exegetical aspects derive in both legal and allegorical sectors. Rabbinic semiology is a collectivist style even in non-legal areas. There is an organic formulation to the rabbinic enterprise. There is an internal language. Religious epistemology is singular in its solo derivation from the a priori text. Mono-linguistic behaviour stems from insular receptivity, yet variation in abstractions are necessarily expansive. Exegetical orientation enables a deep link between the text and the interpretation. The text symbolises an undefined narrative. The only necessity is that there is a relationship between the signs. The semantic range is limited but the semiotic impulse is limitless. There is a range of flexible behaviour and libertarian procedure. 

Similar to the notion of moral precepts there are value concepts or precepts that the sages employed. Rabbinic usage of these precepts are ingrained to further symbolise the religious centrality and unified metric. The diverse usage of precepts allegorises the plurality of discourse. The lack of uniformity and potentiality of alternative interpretations discloses a lack of hierarchical symmetry. There is a linguistic centre of values but no dogmatic centricity. The vast array of divergency pins homogenous exegetical affiliation as the byproduct of pluralistic institutionalism. Founded on a cultural sector optimises a central narrational core that is limited but also limitless. It has its own hegemony yet open to the outside. 

The signs of rabbinic discourse are anthologised in narrational descriptions. These  narratives poetically portray rabbinic execution of legal heritage in the public eye. Their symbolic intent mirrors teleological underpinnings, evaluating actionable consequences. Offering a mighty confidence of visualised prestige implementation captures the ideal law in the pragmatic reality. The law becomes subservient to its realistic function, unable to escape its limited movement. Its power weakened by fragile finitude in the eyes of mortals. The law recognises its borders and is cornered by the narrational melody. Its parameters are illustrated by the lyrical legislator. It becomes an abstract sign in need of meaning in its fragmented formulation. It signals a call for proper actualisation.     

Post-talmudic literature tends to divide lawl and the narrative, unlike its pre-talmudic inclusion. Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah is the single uniform model of this synthesis. He combined, though not congruently, legal and philosophical aspects. Maimonides cultivated a work of talmudic discourse, not codified dogmatism. It is the legal details that enumerates the theology not a systemised faith. The point of exegesis was not to recover what was lost but to expand what was. To provide meaning to the textual precursor. 

The Maimonidean mind is expressive in its affiliation with legal affinities. Maimonides codex similar to the Mishnah was to act as a point of departure for further scholarly conversation. His “updated Mishnah” would be the book of recourse for the Jewish people. The codification namely was anti-maimonidean and averted his intentions. The semiotic nature surrounds the talmudic narrative interweaving allegorical sources into his legal text. Though unlike the talmud narration is deeply lacking. The symbiotic nature in the talmud leverages the law’s capability under implemented criteria. Yet, Maimonides is a storyteller. He paints a picture of the history of idolatry and poses educational lessons to derive. His legality was combined with ethical development. 

The Maimonidean mindset attempts to gloss over uniformity. There is a diverse discussion to attend. His Mishnaic identification modelled the future of rabbinic discourse but was unfortunately inadvertently misinterpreted. The law protruding from the codex acknowledges a personal engagement with the covenantal/cultural sphere. It follows the semiotic paradigm as an autonomous engagement. 

Semiology is subconsciously a deep part of religious discussion. We do not realise it on the surface due to its scholarly complexity but the notion of synchronic connectivity harkens back to semiotic idealisation. Sermons whether legal or philosophical combine varied textual quotations to prove a point. The analogical reasoning and synthesising to authenticate the message is symbolically a signal. Texts are mere words that are absent meaning till we interpret them with grave passion and limitless creativity. To educate ourselves in the depth deductive skills is to signal a link between diverse signs and facilitate a deeper link through the sources but also to the genus of sources. 

References: 

Elisha Ancelovits, “Science and Knowledge as the Means Back to Phronetic (Wise) Law,” Jewish Law Association 29, (2020): 167-195.

José Faur, “Monolingualism and Judaism,” Cardozo Law Review14 ,(1992): 17-13.

Bernard Jackson, “Constructing a Theory of Halakhah” (2012). 

Daniel Reifman, “The Role of Rationales in Halakhic Adjudication: A Semiotic Approach,” PhD diss., Bar-Ilan University, (2015).

Mark Washofsky, “The Woodchopper Revisited: On Analogy, Halakhah, and Jewish Bioethics,” Medical Frontiers and Jewish Law, (2012): 1-62.

Barry Wimpfheimer, Narrating the Law: A Poetics of Talmudic Legal Stories, University of Pennsylvania Press, (2011).