A Complex Past: Biblical Legal Paremeters Part 3--Biblical Semiotics
By: Jonathan Seidel
This part analyses the semiotic textuality in the biblical lingo as implemented law.
Narrative Setting
Prof. Jackson has put forward a revolutionary way of perceiving ancient texts. He prefers to read Biblical law in narrative instead of semantic terms1. He proposes a narrative reading invoking images instead of using words from the literal reading. For example, a semantic account is what does this precisely mean? The former asks what typical situations do the words evoke2? Prof. Burnside argues the advantage is lacking encoding. It relies on the physical context of the message. Prof. Jackson focuses on the Covenant Code or Exodus, and Prof. Burnside looks at the Deuteronomic text. Regarding food laws, the text states, “all winged insects are unclean, so they cannot be eaten, but lean ones can be eaten” (Deuteronomy 14:19-20). Semantically, reading the verses would sound contradictory. If all winged insects are unclean, how can there be clean ones to eat? Prof. Nelson points to Leviticus as complimenting the later Deuteronomy difficulty3. Though many scholars believe the codes were developed separately, this may demonstrate a complementary model against conventional thinking. Prof. Burnside insists this answer is specifically semantic and argues to group them in narration4. The legislator is vague because he assumes the audience’s axiomatic understanding of the law. It is not a random statute but one that reflects the social background. This basic knowledge prevents the audience from struggling to interpret unclean winged insects as those that walk instead of fly.
There are literary similarities between the two; identical phrases. The complementary model would surmise the continuity between the two and the latter code reaffirming the former’s laws. The additional verses point to additional details. Yet, for Prof. Burnside, this is not the case. There is something more at stake here. Land animals in both codes depict split moves and chew cud as clean, omitting any that either does not have any or one without the other. The text does not mention the former predicament logically as it is unnecessary. It points to animals such as the pig that has split hooves but does not chew its cud. Hard cases empower the narrative paradigm.
For aquatic animals to be clean, they must have fins and scales. Unclean does not possess either. Hard cases in Leviticus, listing the different types of lizard, reptilian creatures hints not to the specified lizard or reptilian prohibition but because they do not possess both fins and scales5. They are similar to the pig, only having one of the required sets. There are no parameters for clean and unclean birds.
The text lists the unclean ones seemingly sharing some attributes. The audience must be aware of the clean birds if the text permits eating them. It is reinforcing the a priori law. It paints a picture that the audience can deduce. A clean bird has feathers, flies and has a normal diet of berries and insects6. This also permits later authorities to utilise this thematic articulation to permit birds alien in the region. Jews first discovered turkey when they came to the US. Strictly, the turkey would be permissible because it is not listed, but the Bible could not have been “known” because they did not exist in the region. Yet, if they were a bird of prey or such, they would not be approved. Turkey’s are similar to chicken, so they were allowed. Yet, alternatively, the penguin or kiwi are not native to the Middle East region7. Their absence from the biblical canon may permit them, but their inability to fly disqualifies them. This is not explicit in the text, but it is deduced by the social background of birds and those prohibited. They are examples of hard cases for what is hypothetically problematic. The lack of examples for the specified qualifications attests to the audience’s knowledge of animal anatomy.
The narrative also points to oral transmission of knowledge for the audience's awareness of which animals the text is referring to8. The text intentionally omits an exhaustive list because its purpose is to convey a categorical statute instead of a detailed list. There seems to be philological reasoning for the clean and unclean. Though even if this is socio-historical, it does not negate its function today. The ancient practice developed culturally/tribally. The narrative explicitly links the text to everyday life. Similarly, Prof. Otto argued that biblical cases referred to the countryside9. In a different vein, the countryside here refers to the layman and their frequent everyday encounters. Prof. Burnside notes the order of three edible domesticated followed by seven edible wild animals hints at ancient nomadic herding10.
The listing covers closest to furthest from the paradigm. Prof. Burnside appeals to those that were prevalent to the ancients. The Talmud supplies additional rationales for this listing. This may be a classic Talmudic apologetic attempt to understand the specification. Yet, these qualifications are not closed or eternally exclusive. Unknown creatures may be permitted down the road. The Talmud’s classification helps determine the value behind the choice. Whether intentional or not, there is a nice premise to consuming ethically. R’ Seidenberg remarks that ancient Israelites consumed these animals to retain a healthy ecosystem11. The permitted animals are not competing with humans for food (eat grass and such). A healthy ecosystem depended on healthy herding. Competing humans and domesticated herds for food pits farmers against herders as well as the rich vs the poor today12.
The Bible’s comprehension of a healthy ecosystem is indicative of tribal unity and continuity. It may reflect Prof. Burnside’s attribution of everyday life, but that normative behaviour may underlie a certain value of maintaining a healthy ecosystem. The latter reasoning would provide further validity to its continued use beyond the tribal acceptance. The dietary laws provide a paradigm to apply across the board. Using their environmental background to better implement the practice.
Prof. Jackson takes a similar model to Prof. Ben-Menachem’s book Judicial Deviation in the Talmudic Law13. Prof. Ben Menachem discusses the halakhic model, but the biblical model, as Prof. Jackson argues, follows similar criteria. The paradigm-narrative depiction differs from the modern-semantic construction. Judicial discretion was the dominant model, not rule application. The frequently noted regional norm with divergent details holds to a common theorem varying by underlying values. Prof. Jackson argues that many misinterpret the Bible to follow the rule of law or western law, relying on resolved disputes and rules. The Bible presents a norm of court dissociation. It's about images, not language14. Prof. Jackson presents three cases where the narrative should take primacy over the semantic reading. It is interesting to note if narrative legal interpretations are of biblical uniqueness or a common thread of the ancient world. Prof. Jackson promotes a synchronic perspective of Israelite legality, but just as the legal collections were similar, so to the methodology. Yet, even if this is true that narrative readings were common, it would still promote a synchronic association given the narratives are specific to the Israelite tribe. The laws of protecting the vulnerable are rooted in the slavery experience.
Narrative links to law may be conceptually regular but diversely detailed. An owner is only liable for killing a thief during a day break-in (Exodus 22:2-3). This is a standard translation of the grouped verses. Yet, the text actually never mentions night; it says there is no liability, and in the subsequent verse specifying morning, it implies only at nighttime. As we noted earlier with Prof. Burnside’s examples, the text is worded strongly, almost contradictory. Prof. Jackson notes that in the Roman Twelve Tables the code specifies night, unlike the Biblical canon. The strange wording prompts later editing in a semantic reading15. The semantic reading botches the text as it fails to delineate the correct time of liability permitting it both day and night, seemingly ignoring the ensuing verse. The narrative model surveys synchronically to Job to better explain the law in story/visual terms. In Job, the murderer attacks the poor and needy at night, granting him a thief. They hide during the day and come out at night (Job 24:14-16). Job’s presentation explains the lack of specification. As Prof. Burnside noted, there is common knowledge or social understanding in this example of the thief’s actions16. In an oral society, the depiction of the thief would intuitively be linked with night, and thus the image is primary before the words. Then one could ask what is the point of the subsequent verse noting the daytime? When read carefully, the next verse does not mention the day; it depicts the rising sun as an image rather than writing ‘day’. It is all part of the visual presentation. It is not about proper literary etiquette but the clearest conveyer of information.
Prof. Finkelstein follows the pattern of other diachronic research by noting the commonalities between ancient codes in contrast to modern ones17. Again falling into the ancient common law. Prof. Jackson asks an additional question which is one I believe he retorts Prof. Greenberg, who is similar to Prof. Finkelstein. His retort is applying the rule of law in these cases. It is the semantic reading that these scholars have not distanced from. The language is restricted to textual literalism, disqualifying other potential candidates. The liability for an ox goring another’s ox (Exodus 21:35) is split compensation by both owners to ensure an equal measure of the animals. Yet, the verse fails to specify the value of each ox or its application only if they are equal. So mathematically, if the dead ox was worth 300 but its remains are 50 and the goring ox is 200 when sold. Each will receive the same amount of 125, but the dead ox owner lost 175, and the goring ox owner lost only 75. This also works vice versa if the dead ox is worth less than the goring ox (n. 11,12). The Rabbis insisted on a condition of equality, if not compensation was provided to make up for this practical possibility (M. Bava Kama 1:4). Traditionalists may say that this is Sinaitic law, but for argument’s sake let’s say it is not. We are solely looking at the biblical text, not rabbinic associations (Though they would argue the text is impractical without the rabbinic extensions). Prof. Jackson does not answer what would happen if they were unequal18. The narrative notion answers the qualm with an obvious equal measure.
Semantically, details are important, but narratively they are not. Prof Jackson’s final case is the “eye for an eye” case (Exodus 21:24-25). Ironically, this famed verse is repeated in the New Testament (Matthew 5:38-39). In this vein, Jesus is abhorred by such a law that he argues to disobey and not hit back. We pointed out with R’ Medan that Josephus saw both positions as acceptable. Adoni-Bezek’s mutilation (Judges 1:7) was deliberate and accidental injury is unknown19. The issue with the semantic reading is of a one-eyed man poking out a two-eyed man’s eye, should he lose his only eye? (the Sages even protested with such a response). The retribution is not equal as one is now blinded and the other has one remaining eye. Thus the narrative reading applying only to a two-eyed man is sufficient.
Endnotes
1. Bernard S. Jackson, Studies in the Semiotics of Biblical Law, JSOTSup 314 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2000), pp. 70–92↩
2. Jonathan P. Burnside, “At Wisdom's Table: How Narrative Shapes the Biblical Food Laws and Their Social Function” JBL 135:2 pg. 225.↩
3. Richard D. Nelson, Deuteronomy OTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), pg. 180.↩
7. Are penguins kosher?. R’ Slifkin does not contend with Prof. Burnside’s categorisation of non-flying to prohibit because Ostrich is translated as “bat yanna” in the “ohf”/bird category but it does not fly. Yet, he says it's about being bird-ish. Tacking on the additional requirements of feathers and normal diet may be sufficient to be bird-ish. The Mishnah though classifies these prohibited birds as those of prey not from bird-like features (Chullin 59a). R’ Slifkin ironically quotes a Tosafot proposing a narrative reading against Rashi’s semantic reading (Chullin 61a). Rashi argues the non-kosher birds mentioned are the only non-kosher birds in the world. Tosafot, alternatively, argues the two dozen listings are identifiers of other potential non-kosher animals or in Jacksonian terms it supplies an image to evoke (Jackson Semiotics, pg. 49.). See also: Bernard S. Jackson, “Literal Meaning: Semantics and Narrative in Biblical Law and Modern Jurisprudence,” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 13.4 pg. 437.↩
8. Jackson Semiotics, pg. 96. Prof. Jackson argues the narratives are constructed from “oral residue”. Even as writing flourished the oral aspects remained interlocked. Profs. Hezser and Elman pointed out that through the Talmudic era orality persisted despite the rise in written culture. See: Catherine Hezser, “Bookish Circles? The Use of Written Texts in Rabbinic Oral Culture” Temas Medievales, 25 pg. 64 n. 6 and Yaakov Elman, “Orality and the Babylonian Talmud” Oral Tradition 14:1 pg. 57.↩
9. Eckart Otto, “Town and rural countryside in ancient Israelite law: reception and redaction in cuneiform and Israelite law” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 18:57, pg. 20.↩
10. Burnside Wisdom, pg. 239.↩
11. Why mamals with split hooves? | David Seidenberg | The Blogs.↩
13. Hanina Ben-Menahem, Judicial Deviation in Talmudic Law: Governed by Men, not by Rules. Vol. 1. Taylor & Francis, 1991.↩
16.; Burnside Wisdom, pg. 227.↩
17.; J.J. Finkelstein, “The Ox That Gored,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 72:2 (Philadelphia, 1981), pg. 36.↩
18. Jackson Literal, pg. 442.↩
19.; We could speculate this is only in deliberate situations as Adoni-Bezek is the sole example. Additionally the language articulated by Adoni-Bezek is reflective of Leviticus 24:19 and Dueteronomy 19:19. The former is more relatable as he admits to committing the karmic action instead of intending to do so.↩
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