Neighbouring Influences: Part 2--Rabbinic Influences

By: Jonathan Seidel

Following the previous essay, This one furthers the biblical model and investigates the shift to logic in a hellenised world. The rabbinic mind produced a novel methodology based in rationality and hermeneutical association.   

                                                Talmudic Age

There are two levels concerning greek influence: there is legal interaction and distinctions similar to the biblical model. The present common law affected rabbinic legislation. Secondly, there is the influence around the oral law structure. The methods used to ascertain and derive law are very rational and logical. It is derived from a conception of human initiative.

There is much evidence of Hellenism during the second commonwealth1. Hanukkah is a classic example of Jews fighting Hellenised Jews. In time the priesthood became such as well2; a tool of power and authority (Yoma 18a). Our discussion is not so much in the cultural aspect to the masses or aristocracy but more concentrated on the rabbinic mind. Also, the Hellenism that would affect the rabbinic mind would be of Roman prowess. Same origins but altered mechanics. Transferred through a new vehicle, a new empire, not directly from the Greeks themselves. The rabbis drew from parallel concepts but it was more their intervention that yielded the greatest query. Was rabbinic involvement solely a reaction to the cessation of prophecy or was their greek influence? Diachronically, many of the innovations occurred in the time of Plato and Aristotle. They increased after Alexander the Great’s arrival. Hillel was the primal innovator after Simeon the Just arrived from Babylon rich in greek knowledge (Sukkah 20a). He sparked the usage of logical skills and deduction. Shammi critiqued his unique methods but found a home in rabbinic philosophy and actualisation. Did Hillel mimic greek methodology? Was this anti-divine? This query is unknowable. Given the parallels to other cultures as well as these hermeneutics may be ancient literary techniques. What can be deduced is that time of utilisation. Though we may not know if they are inherently Greek, it stands to reason that greek influence prompted its use3. 

The structure of rabbinic canonisation seems to contain greek influence4. Reading through the Talmud expresses diverse argumentation and logic not inherent to tradition following the cessation of prophecy but to see its bold manifestation is striking. The authorities at the inception of the second commonwealth added enactments (Ezra, Yosef ben Yoezer etc.). To brazenly innovate did arouse rebuke from traditionalists but none of this measured the scholar supremacy that followed. Embedding a system in rationality and logic is unique. The Talmud may be especially Jewish, one of a kind, but it is a Judified Hellenistic expression. Much of these claims are mere conjecture but the timing of this transition does provide potential insight. R' Shimon ben Shetach voiced opposition to the prophetic model (miracle workers) against Honi the circle drawer (M. Taanit 3:8). Nonetheless, the Talmud notes special people accustomed to miracles such as R’ Hanina ben Dosa (Kohelet Rabbah 1, Taanit 24b-25a, Berachot 33a). Rabbinic literature does not hide prophetic prowess even at times to defend it, arguing for its presence (ibid.). Such protection of this model does not negate the actions taken by the central scholars. R’ Yohanan states that he is above R’ Hanina but his relationship with God does not merit miracles (Berachot 34b). Amemer maintains that a scholar is higher than a prophet (Bava Batra 12a). If this is true, why did the prophets exceed in the first commonwealth? In context, Amemer may refer to the second commonwealth era through the destruction of the Second Temple. Even if miracles still occurred it did not merit the same prowess as human reason. The Aristotelian model pervaded the world, inspiring a new mindset. It elevated reason beyond providence. The snake oven is the case that admits to this reality (Bava Metzia 59b). “The Torah is not in heaven” attests to not only is it up to us to decide but we must venture in this direction. The Talmud states that no prophet instituted a law (Sifra Bechokotei 13:7). Though the Torah was not in heaven for hundreds of years, no one established a new practice. It was formalistic transmitted by God and obeyed. Technically this is accurate but only without prevalent prophecy did the Torah cease to be in heaven. It was not merely revelation that brought the Torah to earth but the end of divine communication. The start of a new era pronounced a new methodology. 

Many who propose human initiative following the cessation of prophecy run into a problem. One does not qualify the other; it is a non sequitur statement. Those who state reasons for prophecy’s ending whether being sin or destruction of the Temple do not link human initiative. Generally, the response is, it was the only option. If God stops calling us, we must call him. What brought this on? Nothing like this ever existed. Changing the rules was foreign. If a further statement is added to the Socratic method involving greek influence the logic makes much more sense. Prophecy ended by sin/destruction, Greeks used human reason to connect to the world, Jews mimicked greek methods in connecting to God. This formula authentically links prophecy’s end with human initiative’s birth. R’ Zadok makes a similar claim in his writings (Elman)5. The greek effect was rampant in society. Jews adapted to their new situation by applying cultural methods to their arsenal. This position is disliked because it compromises "Jewish purity". Our sages are perfectly enacting the will of the divine with no influence from any outsiders. Honestly, it is a cop-out to save face. It isn't a big deal if Jews were influenced in pursuing a new agenda. It does not corrupt our legacy. It genuinely recognises the present situation and adapts accordingly. Authorities have always taken social circumstances into account in employing legal decisions. It is ignorant to assert the system is an ever closed structure that is unbiased6. There is much counter-evidence. In each generation authorities quarrel over the traditional law and reality changes. Evolving the law at times. Whether it be Hillel, R’ Yehoshua, Tosafot, R’ Epstein, R’ Uziel or R’ Ovadia, the realisation of societal norms challenged the existing law7. The law wasn't intended to be dogmatic in a colloquial or broad sense, maybe, but not in the details. Those unable to accept potential external effects are hiding away in fear. They do not recognise the benefit enhanced by the encounter. It is not damaging but strengthening. 

Ezra and Hillel were the foremost proponents of change early on. It became apparent and vital to innovate with the Temple’s destruction. The innovative ideology did not begin with the Second Temple’s destruction but during its construction years prior. Following its demolition, it became a more reasonable option. To accommodate a newfound exilic lifestyle a system had to be put into place. Yet after the First Temple’s ruin, nothing of this sort was created. Why did this occur only later? A simple solution could be that the first exile had an end date. The prophecy stated seventy years of exile so returning to old customs was soon. The second exile had no such knowledge. The unknown forced a change in methodology to continue serving. Alternatively, prophecy persisted into the destruction, so human initiative did not warrant inclusion yet. It began only with the start of the second commonwealth. This also demonstrates that the rabbinic deviation did not emerge unexpectedly, rather it was a generating development. 

The Jerusalem Talmud differentiates from the Babylonian in focusing more on tradition8. Human initiative may have burst onto the scene but how that commenced is divided into two schools. The conservatives believe in human initiative insofar as they transmit their rulings or attribute divine prowess to individuals making binding rulings. The liberal side perceives initiative as change. It is not that humans need ambition in decision-making because such will be the case. A traditionalist will always need to evaluate because particular technology or societal alterations did not exist or are accounted for by the sages. He can align it with former ideals and thus prohibit or permit it. The anti-traditionalist will set new categories and demonstrate variety amongst newfound knowledge. He is unafraid to deviate from linear transmission. His use of human reason enables widespread multiplicity and novel interpretations. The traditionalist struggles with newness because its unfamiliarity with the old causes rejection or acceptance of alignment. The anti-traditionalist will utilise logic to deduce if the new accords with the old. It is less looking at face value and more uncovering underlying similarities or differences.  

The irony of Yavneh’s innovative spirit failed to carry much weight in the Jerusalem Talmud. The traditionalists overcame the shift with a more conservative approach. The Babylonian sages instead employed logic for growth. The Sages may have found biblical sources for their legislation but that does not negate its novelty. The extensive argumentation and refutations demonstrate a Socratic methodology as opposed to the short and concise Jerusalem Talmud. Some have contested the influence of Hellenism on the Palestinian Talmud9. It may be so but the rampant traditionalism avoided any conflation. Why was this so? Where did the power of Yavneh go? Shammai is long gone as well as R’ Eliezer’s defeat. Traditionalism was on the decline. How did it regain traction? One of the Jerusalem Talmud’s characteristics is its concentration on a single truth. Opposing the famous notion of “these and those” in the Babylonian Talmud (Eruvin 13b)10. Discrediting multiple opinions with a sole solution. The influence of Origen’s truth model in developing Christianity may have shifted the classic dialectic to the pursuit of truth11. This mode of thinking did not inhibit Babylonian thought. They instead deviated completely from pursuing truth for legitimate multiplicity. It left contradictions unanswered as pillars of truth. The hard push for preservation against Christian growth meant defending singularity. 

Hellenism expressed itself differently in each sector. The Babylonian rabbinical studies resembled the Hellenised philosophical schools12. Most attested by the response of the snake oven case. In the Babylonian version R’ Eliezer is excommunicated for his stubbornness (Bava Metzia 59b). His inability to deviate from his traditional role is hard-pressed. The Jerusalem Talmud supplies a sympathetic alternative to R’ Eliezer, elevating his stature (J. Moed Katan 81c-81d [3:1])13. The differences may seem minute linguistically but rhetorically immense. R’ Eliezer is barred by the majority with no remorse. His methods are outdated and expelled from the centre. In the latter, he is praised but loses anyway. This model gives authorities the power to decide within the traditional frame. The other version wished to demonstrate an innovative deviation from R’ Eliezer’s ancient style. The story of Moses sitting in R’ Akiva’s classroom is mentioned only in the Babylonian text as it accords with innovative persistence (Menachot 29b). In the end, it attempts to cloud this major development in traditional garb. It all came from Moses. Still, the logic employed divested from Jerusalem purview. The innovative spirit’s short life may be due to the more traditional authorities. Beit Shammai may have ceased but remnants of its ideology persisted in the community. 

Endnotes

1. See: Christine Hayes, “Genealogy, Illegitimacy, and Personal Status: The Yerushalmi in Comparative Perspective” The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture III, ed. P. Schäfer (Tubingen: Mohr, 2003), pp. 73–90 See: Christine Hayes, “Roman and Jewish Law: Looking for Interaction in all the Right Places” Law and History Review 37:4 pp. 955-959. Prof. Hayes believes the dissenters’ views of interaction between the two groups is inaccurate. Distaste for Roman ideology does not negate impact. Ishay-Zvi Rosen, “Rabbis and Romanization” Jewish Cultural Encounters in the Ancient Mediterranean and Near Eastern World, ed. Mladen Popovic. Brill, Leiden 2016, pp. 218-245. In response to Prof. Rosen the Sages were not seduced but as Prof. Dohrmann wrote to counter the centrality of legalism in Rome, the Sages publicly formulated their own flag to defend against the external pressure. Constructing a legal centralism of their own. Natalie B. Dohrmann, “Can ‘Law’ Be Private? The Mixed Message of Rabbinic Oral Law,” Public and Private in Ancient Mediterranean Law and Religion, ed. Clifford Ando and Jörg Rüpke, Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 65 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), pp. 187-216.^↩

2. Benyamin Lau, The Sages: Content Character and Creativity trans. Michael Prawer (Vol. I: The Second Temple Period) (Maggid Books, 2010) pp. 281-298.^↩

3 Daniel A. Klein, “Rabbi Ishmael, Meet Jaimini: The Thirteen Middot of Interpretation in Light of Comparative Law” Hakirah 16 pp. 102-106.^↩

4. Dialogue and Dialectics: Talmudic. There are two differences between Talmudic and philosophical  argumentation: concrete cases instead of abstractions and openendness. This difference follows Jewish values. Even if structurally similar, principally diverse. See: Samuel Belkin, In His Image: Jewish Philosophy of Man as Expressed in Rabbinic Tradition London, New York, Abelard-Schuman, 1960 pp. 41-53.^↩

5. Yaakov Elman, “R. Zadok HaKohen on the History of Halakha,” Tradition 21:4 pp. 1-26.^↩

6. R’ Soloveitchik, although believes there are a priori postulates, defines halakha as dynamic. See: Joseph B. Soloveitchik, And From There You Shall Seek, trans. Naomi Goldblum. KTAV, 1978 pp. 108-109. Prof. Schremer argues there is inevitable bias in Adiel Schremer, “Toward Critical Halakhic Studies” The Tikvah Center For Law and Jewish Civilisation. 2010. Schremer notes there is conscious bias pp. 31-32.^↩

7. See Out of Bounds for specific examples.^↩

8. Lau, The Sages, pp. 186-192.^↩

9. See: Saul Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish Palestine. New York, 1950. See also: David Rokeah, Jews Pagans and Christians in Conflict (Leiden: Brill, 1982) pp. 201-202. Prof Rokeah argues Prof Lieberman overemphasised greek influence on the rabbis.^↩

10. David Kraemer, The Mind of The Talmud: An Intellectual History of the Babylonian Talmud (Oxford University Press, 1990) pg. 95.^↩

11. Daniel Boyarin, “Hellenism in Jewish Babylonia” pp. 347-349.^↩

12. Shaye J.D. Cohen, “Patriarchs and Scholarchs,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 48 pg. 85. Catherine Heszer has contested this theory. See: Catherine Hezser, 'Interfaces Between Rabbinic Literature and Graeco-Roman Philosophy.' The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture (eds.) Catherine Hezser and Peter Schaefer Vol.2, (Tuebingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2000) pg. 164.^↩

13. See: Moshe Simon-Shoshan, “The Oven of Hakhinai: the Yerushalmi’s accounts of the banning of R. Eliezer” Journal of Jewish Studies Vol. 71:1 pp. 25-52.^↩